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SOUTH CAROLINA ADOPTION LAW:
OUT OF THE CRADLE INTO THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY*
I. OVERVIEW
Recently married, Jane and Adam looked forward to start-
ing a family together." Although they were blessed with the birth
of a beautiful daughter, April, who brought them a great deal of
happiness, they wanted to give her a little brother or sister. For
six years, to no avail, they tried to have another child. Jane de-
scribed those six years as follows:
After years of countless infertility tests, fertility drugs,
doctors and hospitals, I finally became pregnant about two
years ago. We waited a while before telling our daughter about
the baby. She was so excited when we did tell her. A week
later, I had a miscarriage. This was devastating to all of us,
especially our daughter, because she could not understand.
We went right ahead with more tests and fertility drugs
and little hope from doctors of ever becoming pregnant again.
We finally decided to stop all the tests, because it was draining
us emotionally, mentally, and financially. Our doctor talked
with us about adoption. After much prayerful consideration,
we decided adoption "was" for us, and we decided to try to
adopt.2
As Jane and Adam continued their hopeful vigil for another
child, fifteen-year-old Hester was in the ninth grade. Hester be-
came pregnant by her high school boyfriend and decided that, in
good conscience, she could not keep the baby. After considering
the alternatives, Hester decided to place her child for adoption.
Hester's doctor referred her to an attorney. After reviewing the
* The author expresses his appreciation to Professors Randall M. Chastain and
Eldon D. Wedlock of the University of South Carolina School of Law, and his father,
Fletcher D. Thompson of Thompson, Sinclair and Anderson in Spartanburg, South
Carolina, for their invaluable assistance in the preparation of this Note.
1. Names in this case have been changed to protect the privacy of the parties.
2. Letter from adoptive mother to birth mother (names and date withheld for
reasons of confidentiality) [hereinafter Letter from adoptive mother].
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attorney's background file on prospective parents, Hester de-
cided that Jane and Adam were best suited to raise her child.
The attorney then contacted the couple and informed them of
this possibility. Six weeks later Hester gave birth to a healthy
baby boy; the adoption was completed, and April had a new
baby brother.
Hester wrote a letter to her son to be opened when he ma-
tured enough to understand and appreciate its significance. The
letter, in part, reads as follows:
To my baby,
I just want you to know that this was done purely out of
love. Believe me it wasn't easy! I want you to understand that I
am only 15 and really not capable of taking care of you at this
time in my life .... I'm doing this because I want the best out
of life for you. I really don't know exactly how much of this
you will understand. I love you with all my heart and I always
will. I never will stop thinking about what I have done, but I
know from the bottom of my heart that who ever gets you will
love you too! There will always be a place in my heart for
you .... I wanted to give another person the chance to love
you as much as I do. It's so hard to think about being without
you but I think you will be with me in my heart .... 3
Upon receiving Hester's child into their lives, Jane wrote Hester
a letter, hoping to allay the young birth mother's fears. She
wrote:
I received the letter 'yesterday that you wrote to your
baby. I have read the letter many times and have cried each
time. When we learned about you and the baby about six
weeks ago, I was so excited that I immediately broke out in a
rash! It was hard for us to believe that this was really happen-
ing. During the past six weeks, I have been overcome with
many emotions. I have prayed for your well being as well as
that of the baby .... Our daughter has been praying for a
baby for years now. Anytime that she gets to "wish" for any-
thing, (blowing out candles on a birthday cake, etc.) it's always
for a baby .... Your baby will be given our love just as if I
had had him myself. . . .My husband is a good, loving father.
He will take plenty of time to be there for his child. He really
3. Letter from birth mother to infant child (names and date withheld for reasons
of confidentiality).
[Vol. 40
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likes "to play" and take care of children. He is already plan-
ning what he is going to do with "his son." I hope that this
letter will relieve you of some of your anxiety that you are hav-
ing at this time. Please note that you are constantly in my
thoughts and prayers and that this will not stop once the baby
is born. I wish you all the best in the future to come!"
Bringing a family together for a lifetime of happiness and
love is one of the most rewarding legal endeavors for all parties
involved. Equally important, adoption allows a hardworking
young woman the opportunity to reach her potential without let-
ting a mistake saddle her with responsibilities too great for her
years. With these rich rewards, however, come weighty legal re-
sponsibilities and ethical obligations.
Any oversight by an adoption attorney easily can jeopardize
the future of the adoptive family's life together. To be responsi-
ble for a child's removal from a family who has loved and cared
for the child since birth is a burden no attorney wishes to bear.
The bond established between the adoptive family and the child
is undeniable5 and develops long before the birth of the child.
The loss of even a potentially adoptable baby is routinely char-
acterized as if the child "had died."
'7
Ethical obligations are equally important. The adoptive
family provides extremely personal information and relies on the
attorney's complete confidentiality. The attorney's counseling
also is essential at this emotionally charged time. Further, the
attorney's relationship to the birth mother is susceptible to
charges of overreaching and coercion as young girls are asked to
make adult decisions affecting the rest of their lives.
4. Letter from adoptive mother, supra note 2.
5. One attorney recalls bringing a baby into her new adoptive home to find the
entire extended family awaiting her arrival. After a few moments of excited and emo-
tional introduction, the adoptive grandmother, without a hint of irony, remarked "I
think she has my eyes." This story characterizes the almost instantaneous bonding that
often develops between an adoptive family and their adopted child. See Interview with
Anonymous Member of the South Carolina Bar (December 18, 1988) (name withheld for
reasons of confidentiality).
6. "For the past six weeks I feel as if I have been helping you carry him, in my
heart." Letter from adoptive mother, supra note 2.
7. Describing her feelings upon learning that a birth mother had decided not to
place her child for adoption, the prospective adoptive mother wrote, "We were devas-
tated. It was as if someone had died again. This was the way we had felt after the mis-
carriage." Id.
1989] 769
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This Note explores the attorney's role as practitioner and
the far-reaching ethical considerations that accompany the prac-
tice of adoption law. The focus is on private adoption of unre-
lated children. Additionally, this Note suggests a philosophical
framework through which an attorney's ethical obligations can
be viewed. South Carolina's new adoption laws is discussed in
detail, compared to prior law, and examined constitutionally.
II. SOUTH CAROLINA'S PUBLIC POLICY FAVORING ADOPTION
Adoption in South Carolina finds its earliest roots in two
recorded instances from the 1720s.9 Robert Stephens and his
wife, after the death of their only daughter, took in and raised
an orphan nephew, John Vicardge.10 At their death, they left
their entire estate to John. Similarly, William Crook and his
wife took in and raised their niece, who was not an orphan."
These cases apparently were arrangements of convenience
among families instead of legally cognizable adoptions. In fact,
"[t]he adoption of a child was a proceeding unknown to the
common law. The transfer of the natural right of the parents to
their children was against its policy and repugnant to its princi-
ples.' 1 2 Adoption "is not a natural right"; it exists solely by vir-
tue of statutory authority that "must be strictly construed."'" In
effect, "[t]he general rule is that adoption of a child authorized
by the laws of the state gives it the status of a child of the adop-
tive parent."' 4
Despite lack of a common-law precursor to statutory adop-
tion law, South Carolina courts have demonstrated unswerving
support for adoption. The courts have stated unambiguously
that "[t]he state supports adoption in all ways."' 5 A precise
8. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 20-7-1650 to -1820 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1988).
9. See Kawashima, Adoption In Early America, 20 J. FAM. L. 677, 690 (1982).
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. Driggers v. Jolley, 219 S.C. 31, 36, 64 S.E.2d 19, 21 (1951).
13. Ferguson v. Finch, 310 F. Supp. 1251, 1254 (D.S.C. 1970); accord Goff v. Bene-
dict, 252 S.C. 83, 86, 165 S.E.2d 269, 270 (1969).
14. Cribbs v. Floyd, 188 S.C. 443, 452, 199 S.E. 677, 682 (1938).
15. Frasier v. McClair, 282 S.C. 491, 496, 319 S.E.2d 350, 353 (Ct. App. 1984). The
Frasier court even stated this policy in poetic terms, quoting the following anonymous
poem entitled The Adoptive Mother's Answer.
Not flesh of my flesh
[Vol. 40
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statement of the court's policy in favor of adoption is found in
Bradley v. Children's Bureau of South Carolina.16 In Bradley
the South Carolina Supreme Court recognized "that children are
at times born into circumstances wherein their natural parents
cannot or will not care for them, the State in its role as parens
patriae developed the adoption process to assure stable homes
for these children.' 1 7 Unfortunately, South Carolina adoption
practices have not always promoted the stable home environ-
ment that purportedly follows the adoption process. Further, the
profit motive of some attorneys superseded the best interests of
the adopted child as some attorneys circumvented the adoption
statutes or exploited the absence of necessary safeguards in the
statutes.18
Not bone of my bone
But still miraculously
My own.
Never forget
For a single minute -
You didn't grow under my heart
But in it.
282 S.C. at 496, 319 S.E.2d at 353 (quoting In re Shehady's Estate, 83 N.M. 311, 313, 491
P.2d 528, 530 (1971)).
Another earlier case is reknown more for its hyperbolic flair than its instructive
insights.
[T]he homes of many childless parents have been brightened and made hap-
pier because the [adoption] law .... [O]therwise they would have spent their
early years in ignorance and vice, and in such surroundings have grown up to
young manhood or young womanhood, simply to swell the overflowing ranks of
the vicious and criminal classes of society.
Cribbs v. Floyd, 188 S.C. 443, 454, 199 S.E. 677, 682 (1938).
South Carolina's policy favoring adoption is mirrored by national leaders on both
sides of the aisle. For example, now-President George Bush, when accepting the Republi-
can party's nomination as its presidential candidate, stated, "We must change from
abortion - to adoption. I have an adopted granddaughter. The day of her christening we
wept with joy. I thank God her parents chose life." Acceptance Speech of Vice President
George Bush (Republican National Convention, New Orleans, Louisiana, August 18,
1988). Senator Lloyd Bentsen, the Democratic candidate, stated, "I'm an adopted father,
[I] have an adopted child, and certainly, I think adoption is the appropriate alternative."
Interview with Senator Lloyd Bentsen, This Week with David Brinkley (ABC television
broadcast, October 23, 1988).
16. 275 S.C. 622, 274 S.E.2d 418 (1981).
17. Id. at 625-26, 274 S.E.2d at 420.
18. See infra notes 19-33 and accompanying text.
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III. SOUTH CAROLINA'S NOTORIOUS HISTORY OF ADOPTION
In an article entitled "Newborn Fever; Flocking to an Adop-
tion Mecca,"1 Time magazine described the "hundreds of
couples who flock" to South Carolina each year seeking its
"unique blend of lax laws, aggressive lawyers and open-minded
newspapers that accept classified ads from couples seeking ba-
bies. '20 Couples from around the country advertised in South
Carolina newspapers. One classified ad read as follows:
ADOPTION: Loving, financially secure, college educated
couple. Much love & happiness to give to adopted white new-
born. We invite you to live with us. Share our vacations. Live
like a queen. All expenses paid. Legal and confidential. Please
consider this an opportunity for a new start for you in a boom-
ing area (Houston).2 '
Another couple chose not to limit their adoption possibilities:
"Happily married couple wish to adopt white newborn and/or
toddler up to 2 years . ". .. , Couples arrived by the hundreds
to South Carolina in search of adoptive children because "South
Carolina's adoption laws [were] full of loopholes large enough to
wheel a baby carriage through."23
Liberal waiver provisions diluted the few precautions pro-
vided in the South Carolina statutes. For example, judges could
waive the required six-month waiting period before a final adop-
tion. 4 This practice allowed couples to fly into the state and
leave the same day, baby in arms and adoption complete.25 Al-
though one state statute required a home study to be conducted
of prospective adoptive couples in interstate adoptions to ascer-
tain their fitness, 26 this requirement routinely was waived.2 7
19. Newborn Fever, Flocking to an Adoption Mecca, TIME, Mar. 12, 1984, at 31
[hereinafter Newborn Fever].
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. The State, February 27, 1984, at 7-A, col. 4 (emphasis added).
23. Id., February 29, 1984, at I-A, col. 5.
24. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-2587.11 (Michie Supp. 1975).
25. See Newborn Fever, supra note 19, at 31.
26. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1980 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
27. A review of the records of the South Carolina Children's Bureau by The State,
a Columbia, South Carolina newspaper, indicated that the majority of out-of-state adop-
tions handled by one of South Carolina's busiest adoption attorneys "illegally circum-
vent[ed] the Interstate Compact on Children." The State, February 27, 1984, at 7-A, col.
[Vol. 40
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Similarly, the law required a home study of prospective parents
from within the state, but this requirement was waivable for
"good cause."' 8 Good cause was found more often than not.29
The most striking deficiency in South Carolina's earlier
adoption statute led The State newspaper to proclaim on page
one that "South Carolina Is The Nation's Baby-Buying Super-
market."30 South Carolina Senator Nick Theodore admitted that
South Carolina earned a national reputation as a "baby selling
capital" because "[t]here was no law whatsoever. Our law is void
when it comes to selling of a child."' An attorney in the Green-
ville, South Carolina Solicitor's Office stated that "[s]elling chil-
dren should be illegal, but in South Carolina it is not. It's only
immoral, and that is something that we cannot enforce. '32 South
Carolina's notoriety did not go unnoticed by the national press.
One solicitor was quoted in the New York Times as stating "I
researched it and had an assistant research it and we were una-
ble to find a law in South Carolina that prohibits the outright
sale of children.
' '
1
3
5.
28. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-2587.10 (Michie Supp. 1975).
29. Of thirty-nine adoptions completed by one Charleston law firm in 1982, no
home study was reported for thirty-two of those adoptions. See The State, February 27,
1984, at 7-A, col. 5. Of twenty-four Charleston County adoptions in 1981, no home stud-
ies were reported. See id. The apparently indiscriminate waiver of home studies may
have contributed to the deaths of four infants. An article in The State, a Columbia,
South Carolina newspaper, describes the tragedy as follows:
The distraught Georgia woman begged an upstate South Carolina obstetri-
cian to find her one more baby: Her own three had all died mysterious crib
deaths and she was unable to bear more children.
Touched by the woman's grief, the doctor did find a baby. . . .Two weeks
later the fourth baby was also dead, and the woman confessed she had
smothered him against her breast, as she had the other three, while her hus-
band was at work.
Id. March 1, 1984, at 1-A, col. 6.
30. Id., February 26, 1984, at 1-A, col. 1.
31. Id., June 7, 1984, at 1-C, col. 4.
32. Newborn Fever, supra note 19, at 31. The controversy centered around the re-
port of Simpsonville, South Carolina woman who claimed to have sold her baby for
$3,500, then changed her mind and demanded that her child be returned. See N.Y.
Times, March 4, 1984, at L31, col. 1.
33. Id. at L31, col. 3. The South Carolina Attorney General reached a similar con-
clusion. "In summary, the law in South Carolina concerning the prohibition against the
sale or gift of a child is presently uncertain. Loopholes exist within our present laws
which permit such sales or gifts in various forms. This office, therefore, recommends that
the general assembly enact legislation closing those loopholes." R. CHASTAIN, THE LAW OF
DOMEsTIc RELATIONS IN SOUTH CAROLINA 169 (1986) (quoting unpublished Op. Att'y Gen.
7
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IV. AN ANSWER TO THE CALL FOR REFORM: THE SOUTH
CAROLINA ADOPTION ACT
A. Baby Selling Outlawed
On June 15, 1984, the front-page headline of The State
newspaper proclaimed: "Legislature Outlaws Sales of Babies";
34
the South Carolina legislature had answered the call for reform.
The statute enacted mandated that "[n]o person may sell or buy
a minor child, or request, or accept, receive, or pay any fee...
as consideration for relinquishing the custody of a child for
adoption. '35 If found guilty, a person could be fined $10,000, im-
prisoned for ten years, or both. 6 This statute was the state's
first step toward erasing its besmirched national image as South
Carolina joined the forty-nine other states that prohibit the sale
of children.
37
The statute allows "reasonable costs" to be assessed if they
are "reimbursement for expenses incurred ' 38 such as "actual
medical [costs]," or "reasonable living expenses incurred by the
mother. . . for a reasonable period of time."39 Conversely, other
states, North Carolina, for example, do not permit any payments
to the birth mother, even for hospital expenses or prenatal
care.40 One North Carolina attorney fears that these strict regu-
lations discourage women from visiting their doctors during
pregnancy,41 a dangerous result avoided by the South Carolina
statute. Although South Carolina's statute had partially filled a
blatant legislative void, Senator Nick Theodore called the Act "a
stopgap measure" and recognized that the challenge lay ahead to
address the other "complex" adoption law issues.4
to William B. Traxler, Jr., Solicitor for the Thirteenth Judicial Cir. (April 30, 1984)).
34. The State, June 15, 1984, at 1-A, col. 1.
35. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1060 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988).
36. See id.
37. See Baby Brokers: How Far Can a Lawyer Go?, 9 NAT'L L.J. 22 (1987).
38. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1060 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988).
39. Id. § 20-7-1690(F).
40. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-37 (1984).
41. See Adoption Debate Reopened, 74 A.B.A. J., 30, 31 (March 1, 1988).
42. See The State, June 15, 1984, at 1-A, col. 1.
[Vol. 40
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B. Investigation and Reports
In May 1986 the South Carolina legislature met that chal-
lenge, passing a thoroughly revised version of the Adoption Act.
Perhaps acknowledging that the legal loopholes of the former
statutes were larger than their content, the legislature enacted
sweeping changes. The Act became effective December 3, 1986.
Responding to one of the most abused features of the pre-1986
act, the new statute mandates home studies of prospective adop-
tive couples, and the liberal waiver provisions are eliminated.
The statutory pre-placement investigation requires a detailed
evaluation.43 If an adoptive couple does not receive a child
within one year, the investigation must be updated before final
placement.44
The new Act requires both an examination of the biological
parents' medical history and a postplacement investigation of
the adoption home.45 A detailed list of the requirements for
these investigations is set forth in the statute.46 For example, the
South Carolina Department of Social Services must certify per-
sons conducting these investigations,417 and a directory of all cer-
tified investigators is available. These investigation and report-
ing provisions are important additions to the Act. Previously,
secretaries of adoption attorneys - 'hardly distinterested parties
- reportedly handled some investigations. 4" Qualified profes-
sionals now handle this important task. These investigations
hopefully will prevent the tragic reoccurrence of another woman
asking her doctor to give her just "one more baby. '
43. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1740 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988).
44. See id.
45. See id. § 20-7-1750.
46. See id.
47. See id. These investigators may charge a reasonable fee subject to approval by
the Department. See id. For information, contact the South Carolina Department of So-
cial Services, Post Office Box 1520, Columbia, S.C. 29202-1520.
48. See The State, Feb. 29, 1984, at 1-A, col. 6.
49. See supra note 29.
1989]
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C. Interstate Adoption
1. The Requirement of Unusual or Exceptional
Circumstances
Not only is the legislative purpose of the Adoption Act "to
provide for the well-being of the child, ' 50 the Act also is
designed, given the small number of adoptable children pres-
ently available,5' to afford South Carolinians the opportunity to
adopt.5 2 The statute allows nonresidents to adopt only in certain
prescribed instances, for example when the child has special
needs,53 public notoriety has surrounded the child,54 or one of
the adoptive parents is in the military.55 Finally, the statute per-
mits interstate adoptions when "there are unusual or excep-
tional circumstances such that the best interests of the child
would be served by the placement with or adoption by nonresi-
dents of this State."5
No four words have provoked 'more confusion or disagree-
ment at the adoption bar than "unusual or exceptional circum-
stances. '57 The phrase is not new to South Carolina adoption
law; it can be found in the statutory language as early as 1975,58
yet courts routinely waived this requirement. 59 Under the pre-
sent statute, however, the court must include in its order "spe-
cific findings of fact as to the circumstances allowing. . . adop-
tion of a child by a nonresident.
'6 0
Legislative history of the Act reveals that the "unusual and
exceptional circumstances" language arose as much from politi-
50. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1647 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988).
51. See infra notes 302-305 and accompanying text.
52. "Children may be adopted by or placed for adoption with residents of South
Carolina only.. . ..." S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1647 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988).
53. See id. § 20-7-1670(a).
54. See id. § 20-7-1670(b).
55. See id. § 20-7-1670(d).
56. Id. § 20-7-1670(e).
57. See infra notes 62-68 and accompanying text.
58. See id. § 10-2587.4 (Michie Supp. 1975).
59. "One reason South Carolina has become a mecca for adoptive couples from
other states is its loose and indefinite provision for out-of-state adoptions. State law says
out-of-state parties may adopt a child here 'under unusual or exceptional circumstances,'
but it does not provide any guideline for determining what is unusual or exceptional."
The State, Feb. 29, 1984, at 19-A, col. 2-3.
60. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1670 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988).
[Vol. 40
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cal compromise as it did from substantive policy. During the de-
bates on the adoption bill, two vocal camps developed - one in
favor of granting broad authority for interstate adoption, the
second advocating a total ban on out-of-state adoption. The
compromise language resolved tension surrounding the bill and
secured its passage. Nevertheless, the compromise also created
another tension: uncertainty surrounding what factors constitute
"unusual or exceptional circumstances" and how adoptions can
be finalized absent this knowledge.
The March 1988 amendments eased this tension by provid-
ing a pre-birth hearing to determine the existence of "unusual or
exceptional circumstances."'" Therefore, if an attorney is unsure
if an interstate adoption satisfies the "unusual or exceptional
circumstances" test, this uncertainty can be resolved without
subjecting the parties to the emotional anguish inherent in a
failed adoption.
No South Carolina court has yet defined "unusual or excep-
tional circumstances." Some family court judges maintain that
the legislature designed the Act to prevent interstate adoption
entirely, and staunchly refuse to grant these adoptions under
any circumstances.2 Other judges, routinely upon motion of the
adoptive couple, find "unusual or exceptional circumstances" to
exist.63 Unfortunately, but not unexpectedly, this dichotomy
may prompt judge-shopping in some jurisdictions. The need for
legislative or judicial definition of this language is obvious.
The following factual scenarios, developed through inter-
views with adoption attorneys and family court judges statewide,
provide guidance as to what will likely satisfy the test in courts:
(1) A birth mother testifies that because of her close friend-
ship with the out-of-state adoptive family, she will place the
child for adoption only with them. If not allowed, she will abort
the child or not place the child for adoption.
(2) Given the special obligations placed on the adoptive
family in an open adoption6 4 of nonblood related persons, an
61. See id.
62. Telephone interviews with South Carolina Family Court judges (January - July
1989).
63. Id.
64. "An open adoption occurs when, prior to the adoption, it is agreed in writing
that the child will have continuing contact with one or more members of his or her bio-
logical family after the adoption is completed." Amadio and Deutsch, Open Adoption:
19891 777
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adoptive family's willingness to undertake these obligations may
be considered unusual and exceptional circumstances.
(3) An adoptive- family pays the living and prenatal ex-
penses of a birth mother who agrees to place her child for adop-
tion with that family. The adoptive family later moves out of
state prior to the birth of the child.
(4) One of the legislative purposes of the Act is to allow
South Carolina residents the opportunity to adopt.6 If the
adoptive family has strong ties to the state, such as extended
family members living in South Carolina, this legislative purpose
arguably is achieved and therefore constitutes unusual and ex-
ceptional circumstances.
(5) The birth mother has expressed more than the usual cu-
riosity about the adoptive family and a court fears the confiden-
tiality of the adoption process could be jeopardized.
A second tier of arguments that can be made in attempting
to satisfy the "unusual or exceptional. circumstances" require-
ment focus on the birth mother's view of the best interest of the
child. Examples of these arguments are as follows:
(1) The mother desires to have the child raised by adoptive
parents of a specified religion.
(2) The adoptive family is selected from a list of nonidenti-
fying background profiles as being best suited to give the child a
happy home.
The difficulty with this second tier of arguments is that the Act
does not specify how a child's best interest should be deter-
mined: are a child's best interests solely a matter of judicial dis-
cretion, or do the wishes of the birth mother deserve substantial
deference?
First, one may argue that the person giving up her rights in
a child should be the last person to determine the best interests
of that child. This approach, however, would operate to discour-
age adoptions; many birth mothers consent only because they
believe their child will be placed in a home they consider
suitable.
Second, if a birth mother offers her consent to an adoption
Allowing Adoptive Children to "Stay in Touch" With Blood Relatives, 22 J. FAM. L. 59,
60 (1983).
65. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
778 [Vol. 40
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contingent on her child being placed with a certain family, a
strong argument exists that the State cannot justifiably place a
child anywhere but in the home selected by the birth mother.
South Carolina courts have recognized the principle that the
birth mother's consent "lies at the foundation of our adoption
statute."6 If that consent is granted based on a birth mother's
belief that her child is to be placed with a certain family or a
family possessing certain specified characteristics, the State can-
not place the child with another family without obtaining the
birth mother's unconditional consent or approval of the new
adoptive family. Any other result would condone a state-spon-
sored manipulation of the birth mother's freedom of choice and
erode the consent agreement, which purportedly is the founda-
tion of the adoption statute.
Admittedly, to elevate the birth mother's desires to a differ-
ent level probably would strip much force from the "unusual or
exceptional circumstances" language. Nevertheless, given the
safeguards of the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Chil-
dren67 and the constitutionally protected relationship a birth
mother enjoys with her child, 8 the State's interest in limiting
adoptions to South Carolina residents pales in comparison.
2. The Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children
The State's interest in protecting children is at the core of
the adoption statute.6 9 It is most compelling concerning the chil-
dren placed out of state. In that case, the State has no assurance
that the same protections and services that it provides will be
available in the receiving state. The need for regulation of inter-
state placements gave rise to the Interstate Compact on the
Placement of Children (Compact). ° South Carolina, along with
forty-nine other states, is a member of the Compact, which is "a
66. Hucks v. Dolan, 288 S.C. 468, 470, 343 S.E.2d 613, 614 (1986).
67. See infra notes 69-83 and accompanying text.
68. See infra notes 154-172 and accompanying text.
69. "The purpose of this subarticle is to. . . provide for the well-being of the child
.... " S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1647 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988).
70. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1980 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1988). The excep-
tions are New Jersey, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and Guam. See Oney, Legal
Aspects of Interstate Adoptions, 38 J. Mo. B. 428 (1982).
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contract among the states that enact it."' 7' The Compact con-
tains ten articles that provide the scope of its coverage, the pro-
cedures for interstate adoptions, and the protections mandated.
In an effort to safeguard both the child and the parties involved
in the child's adoption, the Compact: (1) provides the sending
state the opportunity to obtain home studies and evaluations of
the proposed adoptive family;
72
(2) allows the receiving state the opportunity to insure that
the placement is not "contrary to the interests of the child" 73
and that the receiving state's laws and policies have been fol-
lowed before placement is approved;
74
(3) guarantees the child's legal and financial protection by
fixing these responsibilities with the sending individual;75
(4) insures that the sending individual does not lose juris-
diction over the child after the child moves to the receiving
state;7' and
(5) the Adoption Act also allows the sending individual the
opportunity to obtain reports on the child's adjustment and pro-
gress in the placement.
77
Each state appoints an administration to oversee compli-
ance.78 Out-of-state placements are subject to the Compact if
the receiving and sending states are members of the Compact,79
however, some requirements of the Compact may be waived if
the receiving party is a close relation to the adoptive child.s0
71. The Secretariat to the Ass'n of Adm'rs of the Interstate Compact on the Place-
ment of Children, Guide to the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children 3
(June 1985). The purpose of the Act is "to cooperate with [party states] in the interstate
placement of children." S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1980 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
72. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1980(1)(a)-(c) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
73. Id. § 20-7-1980(3)(d).
74. Id. § 20-7-1980(3)(a).
75. See id. § 20-7-1980(5)(a).
76. See id. § 20-7-1980(5).
77. See id. § 20-7-1740(B) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988).
78. See § 20-7-1980(7). South Carolina's Compact Administrator currently is James
L. Solomon, Jr., Commissioner of the South Carolina Department of Social Services. The
Deputy Administrator for Adoption Services currently is Ms. Mary Jo Morrison, South
Carolina Department of Social Services, P. 0. Box 1520, Columbia, South Carolina 29202
(803) 734-5670.
79. "The Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children is hereby enacted into
law and entered into with all other jurisdiction legally joining therein in form substan-
tially as follows: . . ." Id. § 20-7-1980.
80. See id. § 20-7-1980(8)(a).
[Vol. 40
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State placements made in violation of the Compact constitute a
violation of the "laws respecting the placement of children of
both the state in which the sending agency is located or from
which it sends or brings the child and of the receiving state."81
Both jurisdictions may levy penalties on violators.
Additionally, since 1980, several courts have ordered that il-
legally placed children be returned to the sending state. In In re
Adoption of T.M.M. 2 the Montana Supreme Court ordered the
adoptive child removed from the home of the adoptive family
and returned to the birth mother based on the adoptive parents'
failure to comply with terms and procedures of the Compact. In
another instance the courts of the sending state assumed juris-
diction over the child, removed the adoptive child from the per-
spective family's care, and placed the child in a foster home. The
court ordered that the adoptive couple have a home study, but
before completion of the study, the birth mother revoked her
consent to adopt, and the child was returned to the birth par-
ents.8 3 Because adoption laws differ so greatly among the states,
any adoption attorney attempting to make an interstate place-
ment must have knowledge of both the sending and receiving
states' child placement laws and approach interstate adoptions
with considerable caution.
D. Consent to Adoption by Birth Mother
South Carolina case law has decreed that "[c]onsent lies at
the foundation of our adoption statute. The court cannot issue a
valid adoption decree unless the parent has consented or for-
feited her. . . parental rights through abandonment or miscon-
duct. ' s4 The Act defines consent as "the informed and voluntary
release in writing of all parental rights, 8s5 and prohibits consent
obtained through duress or coercion.86 Clearly, therefore, the co-
ercive tactics used by some lawyers to obtain the birth mother's
consent negate the public policy behind the adoption law.87 Be-
81. Id. § 20-7-1980(4).
82. 186 Mont. 460, 608 P.2d 130 (1980).
83. See Oney, supra note 70, at 429.
84. Hucks v. Dolan, 288 S.C. 468, 470, 343 S.E.2d 613, 614 (1986).
85. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1650(f) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988).
86. See id. § 20-7-1700(A)(10).
87. One attorney threatened pregnant women with jail sentences if they would not
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hind this egregious conduct lies the notion that birth mothers
considering adoption "'are a bunch of welfare bimbos' who get
more consideration for their rights than they deserve.""8
The most delicate task for the adoption attorney perhaps is
obtaining the birth mother's consent, a task requiring high ethi-
cal standards.8 9 Developing a relationship of mutual trust and
respect is essential to this process. One important element in a
birth mother's decision is her feeling that every interested party,
including the adoptive parents' attorney, wants the best for her
and her child. An insensitive word or act - as simple as failing
to return a phone call - could jeopardize an adoption. Through-
out the pregnancy, the adoption attorney repeatedly should con-
fer with the birth mother, gauge her need for reasonable living
expenses,90 and assess her state of mind concerning the adop-
tion. Additionally, the attorney should inform her of her legal
rights involving adoption and may offer emotional support.9 1
Another important step suggested by statute is for an adop-
tion attorney to refer the pregnant woman to trained counsel-
ors92 to ensure that a woman's decision to place her child for
adoption, in fact, is her settled intention. 3 This practice pro-
tects not only the emotional psyche of the birth mother, it also
sign the consent form. See Baby Brokers: How Far Can a Lawyer Go?, 9 NAT'L L.J. 22, 24
(1987)[hereinafter Baby Brokers]. One young woman was lied to about her stage of preg-
nancy, advised that she was four months pregnant, not two months, therefore effectively
eliminating the abortion alternative. See 60 Minutes: Baby For Sale (CBS television
broadcast, July 27, 1975).
88. The State, Feb. 26, 1984, at 6-A, col. 6 (quoting an unidentified South Carolina
family court judge).
89. See infra notes 294-312 and accompanying text.
90. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1690(F)(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988).
91. A lawyer should advise her client of the possible effect of each legal alternative,
bringing to this decision-making process the fullness of her experience and objective
viewpoint. In assisting her client to reach a proper decision, a lawyer should point out
those factors that may lead to a decision that is morally, as well as legally, permissible.
She may emphasize the possibility of harsh consequences that might result from asser-
tion of legally permissible positions. In the final analysis, however, the lawyer should
remember that the decision whether to forego legally available objectives or methods
because of nonlegal factors is- ultimately for the client and not for herself. See CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, EC 7-8 (1989) (emphasis added).
92. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1700(A)(8) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988) states that the
birth mother must understand that no consent should be given if she needs or desires
"psychological or legal advice, guidance, or counseling."
93. See Telephone interview with Laurie T. Williams, Ph.D., P.C., Clinical Psy-
chologist, Professional Psychotherapy Associates, Harriman, Tennessee 37748 (June 30,
1989).
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protects the prospective adoptive parents from the loss of a
child they have grown to love."4 Additionally, prior counseling
may evidence the voluntariness of her consent.
Surprisingly, most birth mothers are not aware that the at-
torney has a vested interest in persuading them to give up their
babies,9 5 with the result that the attorney is particularly suscep-
tible to charges of overreaching and coercion. Therefore, the at-
torney's disclosure of his financial relationship with the prospec-
tive adoptive family is essential. Further, he must explain the
full gambit of the birth mother's legal options.96
The Act also dictates the content of the consent form.9 7 At
the core of the birth mother's consent to adoption are three ba-
sic principles: (1) that she understands she is forfeiting all rights
and obligations with respect to the child;98 (2) that once her con-
sent is given it cannot be withdrawn except by order of the court
upon a showing that it is in the best interests of the child and
was not voluntary;99 and (3) that after the final decree of adop-
tion, her concert is irrevocable. 100 To prevent later charges of co-
ercion and involuntariness, some attorneys' consent forms re-
quire the birth mother to initial each statement separately.
An additional precaution prescribed by statute is that the
consent form be signed in the presence of two witnesses, one of
whom must be a family court judge, an attorney who does not
represent the prospective adoptive couple, or a person certified
by the Department of Social Services.10 While the statute allows
the attorney representing the couple to be one of the two wit-
nesses, this practice poses ethical questions. Clearly, the birth
mother's willingness to sign a consent form is in the attorney's
94. See infra note 7.
95. See L. McTAGGART, THE BABY BROKERS 276 (1980).
96. At least one South Carolina attorney asserts that the attorney representing the
adoptive parents should not undertake the task of informing the birth mother of her
legal rights. In fact, this attorney argues that the potentiality of charges of overreaching
is so great that the attorney should have no contact with the birth mother. Instead, he
should direct all inquiries to the birth mother's attorney. The birth mother's attorney
arguably can champion the birth mother's needs more aggressively and will explain com-
prehensively the birth mother's legal alternatives. Interview with anonymous member of
South Carolina Bar (March 18, 1989) (name withheld for reasons of confidentiality).
97. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1700(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988).
98. See id. § 20-7-1700(A)(6).
99. See id. § 20-7-1700(A)(7).
100. See id.
101. See id. § 20-7-1705(1)-(3).
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professional and financial interest. The attorney is thus subject
to charges of overreaching or coercion, so he should not serve as
a witness if possible. If no other person is available who meets
the statutory requirements, the attorney should give the other
witness an opportunity to talk with the birth mother alone and
uninterrupted so that he can form his own opinion concerning
the birth mother's state of mind. Then, when the birth mother is
prepared to sign, the attorney may enter the room and witness
the signing.
Timing of the signing of the consent form presents addi-
tional opportunities for later claims of involuntariness. The
Adoption Act does not address the question of when a release
may be signed. The Draft ABA Model State Adoption Act pro-
poses that a "consent . . . of a biological mother may not be
taken until forty-eight (48) hours after birth of the adoptee.' 0' 2
This provision is designed to "insure clear thinking on the part
of the mother, yet [be] short enough that the consent can be
taken before the infant leaves the hospital."'10 3 To further these
aims, at a minimum, adoption attorneys should follow a self-im-
posed rule to refrain from offering the consent form for signa-
ture until twenty-four hours after birth. Even then, the attend-
ing physician should verify that the birth mother is fully aware
of her actions.
E. Withdrawal of Consent
Every adoption attorney fears receiving a notice of with-
drawal of consent from a birth mother. To an adoptive family,
this could be catastrophic. For this reason, the adoptive family
should be cautioned that even though a birth mother rarely has
the child returned to her custody, this situation is not inconceiv-
able. There are three possible categories of withdrawal of con-
sent cases: (1) consents that are void ab initio; (2) consents that
are involuntary or obtained through coercion or duress; and (3)
consents that are voluntary, yet the birth mother later changes
her mind and seeks to have the child returned.
Certainly, if the natural parent never signed the consent
102. ABA Model State Adoption Act § 11, reprinted in 19 FAM. L.Q. 103, 113 (1985)
(Tentative Draft 1984).
103. Id. (quoting comments to draft).
[Vol. 40
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form or her signature was obtained through fraud, an adoption
will be considered null and void.104 Further, if the natural parent
attempted to reserve the right to visit the child after the adop-
tion decree is entered, the court will find that this conditional
relinquishment is "inconsistent with consent"1 5 and declare the
consent invalid.
The second category of consent withdrawal arises when a
birth mother alleges that her consent arose through duress, coer-
cion, or was for some other reason involuntary. South Carolina
Code Section 20-7-172016 sets out two basic requirements for
withdrawal of consent: (1) the consent must have been involun-
tarily given and (2) the withdrawal of consent must be in the
best interest of the child. To allow withdrawal of consent only
upon a showing of lack of voluntariness or duress would elimi-
nate the "best interests" requirement. Therefore, a close reading
of the statute indicates that absent fraud or an invalid consent,
a birth mother's consent cannot be withdrawn even if it was not
fully voluntary unless she can also satisfy the best interests of
the child test. Under some circumstances, the harshness of this
statutory mandate is difficult to justify. If, however, a birth
mother could prove that her consent was granted under exces-
sively coersive circumstances, this may rise to the level of fraud
and thereby render the consent invalid.
South Carolina courts are reluctant to find that the consent
was involuntary. For example, in Phillips v. Baker,10 7 sixteen-
year-old Lisa Phillips gave birth to a baby girl on January 25,
1982. The next day Lisa signed a consent to adoption form. On
January 27, the Bakers took the child home from the hospital
and filed an adoption petition. A week later, Lisa changed her
mind and filed a petition to withdraw consent. The court found
the consent, which was signed in the presence of the birth
mother's parents, her attorney, and a hospital social worker, to
be voluntary.108 The court adopted a rigid standard for estab-
104. See Wold v. Funderburg, 250 S.C. 205, 157 S.E.2d 180 (1967); see also Lowe v.
Clayton, 264 S.C. 75, 212 S.E.2d 582 (1975).
105. McLaughlin v. Strickland, 279 S.C. 513, 517, 309 S.E.2d 787, 790 (Ct. App.
1983); see also In re Anonymous Member of the South Carolina Bar, Order of South
Carolina Supreme Court, February 21, 1989.
106. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1720 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988).
107. 284 S.C. 134, 325 S.E.2d 533 (Ct. App. 1985).
108. See 284 S.C. at 137, 325 S.E.2d at 535.
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lishing duress: the birth mother must show "a condition of mind
produced by improper extensive pressure or influence that prac-
tically destroys the free agency of a party and causes him to do
an act or form a contract not of his own volition."' 9
The Phillips court also recognized that the traditional view
was that consent could be withdrawn anytime before the final
adoption decree.110 The court, however, noted the following:
[T]he more modern trend disallows the revocation of con-
sent voluntarily given particularly where the adoptive parents
have taken the child into their home in reliance upon the con-
sent .... [T]he right to revoke consent is not absolute, and
... the trend is in favor of enforcing consent when voluntarily
given and accompanied by reliance on the part of the adoptive
parents. The South Carolina statutory adoption scheme leaves
the question of withdrawal in the judge's discretion, assuming
the Consent to Adopt is on file."'
109. Id. (quoting Cherry v. Shelby Mut. Plate Glass & Casualty Co., 191 S.C. 177,
183, 4 S.E.2d 123, 126 (1939)) (emphasis added). Additionally, the court determined
whether withdrawal of consent was in the child's best interests. After carefully examin-
ing Lisa's home environment, the court discovered that her father had referred to the
unborn child as a "bastard" who would not be welcomed in his home. See id. at 136, 325
S.E.2d at 534. The adoptive parents were found to be "mature, settled individuals." Id.
Lisa argued that in considering the best interests of the child, presumptive weight should
be given her biological relationship, not the maturity and stability of the adoptive
couple. See Domestic Relations, Annual Survey of South Carolina Law, 38 S.C.L. Ray.
111, 114 (1986) [hereinafter Domestic Relations]. While this decision is described by the
trial judge as "not easy," 284 S.C. at 136, 325 S.E.2d at 535, the court found that the best
interests of the child demanded continued custody of the adoptive family. The Act
clearly states that "when the interest of a child and an adult are in conflict, the conflict
must be resolved in favor of the child." S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1647 (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1988). Some jurisdictions assert that "the status of the natural parent is so vital in deter-
mining the best interest of the child that it may offset ... the cultural and material
advantages the adoptive parents might provide." See Domestic Relations, supra at 109.
Even so, the blood relationship is not given conclusive weight but only is considered as
one factor; when a great difference exists between the parties' cultural and material fac-
tors, the biological tie probably will not tip the scale. See id. Apparently, therefore, a
birth mother begins withdrawal of consent proceedings with the scales of justice weighed
against her claim. This presumption against the birth mother is particularly true when
the child has been in the adoptive home long enough for familial bonds to develop. In
Phillips the child had been in the adoptive home for two years when the Supreme Court
heard the case, and the family had "formed a bonding relationship with the child." 284
S.C. at 136, 325 S.E.2d at 535.
110. See 284 S.C. at 137, 325 S.E.2d at 535.
111. Id. (quoting Ellison v. Camby, 269 S.C. 48, 51, 236 s.E.2d 197, 198 (1977)) (em-
phasis added) (citations omitted). Compare Driggers v. Jolley, 219 S.C. 31, 64 S.E.2d 19
(1951) (family court lost jurisdiction to proceed with adoption when natural parents
20
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Section 20-7-1720 codifies this modern trend and removes
the requirement of reliance. Had the Phillips decision been
made after the passage of section 20-7-1720, the best interests
analysis would have been unnecessary since voluntariness had
been established.
The third category of consent arises when a birth mother
grants her consent to an adoption freely and voluntarily. The
statute clearly gives this birth mother no recourse. Further, even
if involuntariness can be established, the birth mother may not
attempt to withdraw her consent after the final adoption
decree.
112
F. Termination of Parental Rights: Abandonment of
Children
The natural parents' consent to adoption is not required if
their parental rights have been judicially terminated."13 Parental
withdrew their consent) with Ellison v. Camby, 269 S.C. 48, 236 S.E.2d 197 (1977) (filing
of consent and adoption to be in best interests of child; must be sufficient to allow
adoption).
112. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1720 (Law. Co-op. & Supp. 1988).
113. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1695(A)(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988); see also Ginn
v. Ginn, 278 S.C. 217, 217, 294 S.E.2d 42, 43 (1982) ("Appellant's parental rights in his
minor daughter were terminated, thereby permitting respondent ... to adopt the child
without appellant's consent.").
The Children's Code does not provide a precise analytical framework for the termi-
nation of parental rights. While the termination of parental rights (TPR) statute, S.C.
CODE ANN. § 20-7-1560 to -1582 (Law. Co-op. 1976) provides one procedure for the termi-
nation of parental rights, the Adoption Act provides another means by which a parent's
consent to an adoption is not required. See S.C. CODE ANN. 20-7-1690 (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1988). These two provisions differ in three significant ways, and these differences dictate
to the adoption attorney when the respective statutes should be employed. First, the
TPR statute is broad, allowing termination of parental rights for a myriad of reasons
such as drug addiction and mental incapacity. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1572(6) (Law.
Co-op. 1976).
Also, the standard used in the abandonment portion of the TPR statute is subjec-
tive, requiring intent to abandon. See infra note 118 and accompanying text. Conversely,
the Adoption Act only has an abandonment provision and mandates that a purely objec-
tive determination be made. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1690 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988).
Therefore, as to a charge of abandonment, a defending parent can more easily satisfy the
TPR statute than the Adoption Act.
The second difference between these statutes is that both are not always available.
For example, while the Adoption Act procedure has the practical effect of terminating
parental rights by specifying those parents whose consent to an adoption is not neces-
sary, this procedure must be used in conjunction with an adoption proceeding. See id. §
20-7-1690. If no adoption proceeding is pending, the TPR statute is the sole procedure
21
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rights may be terminated on various objective grounds including
child abuse or neglect,"" parental alcohol or drug addiction,
mental illness, or extreme physical incapacity. 115 A more difficult
issue is posed in determining a parent's subjective state of mind.
This subjective inquiry is required in analyzing cases of child
abandonment - another ground for judicial termination of pa-
rental rights.
Code sections 20-7-1572(3) and (4), which provide for orders
terminating parental rights (TPR), define child abandonment.
1 6
While these sections do not specifically employ the term "aban-
donment," they embody the notion generally referred to as
abandonment." 7 The subjective nature of the inquiry is appar-
ent because the court must find an intent to abandon." 8 While
available. A conflict between these statutes was anticipated by § 20-7-1582, which states
that adoption law supersedes the TPR statute and cannot modify the Adoption Act un-
less specifically provided. See id.
This conflict gives rise to the third difference between these statutes: to whom they
apply. The Adoption Act states that a mother must always give her consent to an adop-
tion. See id. § 20-7-1690. On the other hand, only certain categories of biological fathers
have the right to withhold consent, and the adoption statute specifically delineates what
acts are considered to be abandonment. Section 20-7-1695, however, states that notwith-
standing this different treatment of mother and father under § 20-7-1690, consent is not
required of either father or mother whose parental rights have been terminated under
the TPR statute. The difficulty with reading these statutes consistently is that the Adop-
tion Act mandates one standard of conduct for fathers, none for mothers, see id. § 20-7-
1690, and the TPR draw no such distinctions. See id. § 20-7-1572. Therefore, the only
interpretation that would allow the mandates of § 20-7-1690 to stand would be to disal-
low the TPR statute from being applied to the father in an adoption proceeding and
allowing the TPR statute from applying to a birth mother. Of course, if a biological
father's rights had been terminated in a prior proceeding under the TPR statute, his
consent to a later adoption proceeding would not be necessary. See id. § 20-7-1695.
In short, when an adoption proceeding is pending, a mother's rights should be ana-
lyzed under the TPR statute and the father's rights under § 20-7-1690. If no adoption
proceeding is pending, both the mother and father's rights should be analyzed under the
TPR statute.
The obvious equal protection and substantive due process problems with this statu-
tory scheme are many. See infra notes 152-279 and accompanying text.
114. See S.C. CoDE ANN. § 20-7-1572(1) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
115. See id. § 20-7-1572(6).
116. See id. § 20-7-1572(3), (4).
117. The supreme court has stated that "abandonment denotes 'any conduct on the
part of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego all duties and relinquish all
parental claims to the child.'" Donahue v. Lawrence, 280 S.C. 382, 385-86, 312 S.E.2d
594, 597 (Ct. App. 1984) (quoting McCormick v. McMurray, 260 S.C. 452, 455, 196
S.E.2d 642, 643 (1973)).
118. See Bevis v. Bevis, 254 S.C. 345, 351, 175 S.E.2d 398, 400 (1970) ("A voluntary
act or a conscious disregard of the obligations owed by a parent to the child" must be
22
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the trial judge will be accorded wide discretion," 9 a finding of
abandonment requires clear and convincing proof.120
Most cases concerning abandonment' 21 focus on whether a
parent has "willfully failed to visit a child"'122 who has lived
outside the home of either parent for a period of six months.1
23
While some parents simply admit they have no excuse for not
visiting the child,124 most parents defending termination pro-
ceedings deny the willfullness of their abandonment. For in-
stance, if the custodial parent remarries, moves out of state, and
the custodial parent's "antagonistic attitude" makes visitation
"inadvisable, if not impossible," parental rights will not be ter-
minated. 25 Also, a defending parent successfully argued that she
"despaired of exercising her visitation rights because of [the cus-
todial parent's] conduct in placing strict limitations on her
rights to visit her daughter.' 1 26 Nevertheless, this type of de-
fense cannot be a subterfuge for the defending parent's inade-
quate efforts.
27
Some judicial support is found for the notion that the
trauma of a separation may be a defense to a failure to visit the
child in the custody of an estranged spouse. For example, the
court of appeals in Donahue v. Lawrence 2s stated in dicta that
"[a]ssuming there was some trauma following the parties' sepa-
ration and divorce, there is no evidence that this trauma
continued.'
1 29
found.).
119. See id. at 351, 175 S.E.2d at 402; accord Ginn v. Ginn, 278 S.C. 217, 218, 294
S.E.2d 42, 43 (1982) (family court acted within its discretion in terminating father's pa-
rental rights).
120. See Cooley v. Cooley, 296 S.C. 119, 121, 370 S.E.2d 896, 897 (Ct. App. 1988).
121. See infra notes 122-151 and accompanying text. Much of the cited authority
was decided prior to the enactment of the present abandonment statue. These cases,
however, have been included in this discussion because the prior statute was similar to
our present statute. The courts' analysis, therefore, is instructive.
122. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1572(4) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
123. See id. § 20-7-1572.
124. See., e.g., Donahue v. Lawrence, 280 S.C. 382, 387, 312 S.E.2d 594, 597 (Ct.
App. 1984) ("I do not have any good excuse for not visiting my children.").
125. See, e.g., D'Augustine v. Bush, 269 S.C. 342, 348, 237 S.E.2d 384, 387 (1977).
126. Wilson v. Higgins, 294 S.C. 300, 304, 363 S.E.2d 911, 914 (Ct. App. 1987).
127. See Ginn v. Ginn, 278 S.C. 217, 219, 294 S.E.2d 42, 43-44 (1982) (parent's claim
that he could not visit his child because his former wife had an unlisted phone number
did not pass judicial muster).
128. 280 S.C. 382, 312 S.E.2d 594 (Ct. App. 1984).
129. 280 S.C. at 387, 312 S.E.2d at 597.
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If for reasons beyond the defending party's control, the par-
ent cannot visit the child, other efforts must be made to commu-
nicate with the child. For example, when a father was impris-
oned, his failure to write adequately or communicate with his
child was held to be evidence of intent to abandon the child. 30
Financial inability to travel is also a defense to abandonment.'31
The defending party must, however, communicate in some man-
ner with the child.132 Even a paraplegic parent is responsible for
visiting the children despite his infirmity; 33 if he can travel to
job interviews, then he can travel to see his children. 3 4 In short,
a defending parent, claiming that his lack of visitation was not
willful, must have a persuasive excuse.
Similarly, defending parents often claim that their failure to
contribute to the support of their child was not willful. If the
defending parent claims that he cannot afford to offer any con-
tribution of support to his child, yet the evidence demonstrates
that he has $7,000 in the bank, his argument will be short-
lived. 35 Equally as damaging to a defending party's claim of fi-
nancial distress is an admission on cross-examination that he
was making monthly payments of $169 on a new truck, but pay-
ing nothing toward his $100 monthly support obligation.'36
On the other hand, if the facts show that a parent's failure
to offer support was "motivated largely by financial necessity
and not from a settled purpose to relinquish all parental claims
to her child, 1 3 7 abandonment will not be found. If, however, in-
difference to the rights of the child'38 precipitated this financial
130. See Hamby v. Hamby, 264 S.C. 614, 618, 216 S.E.2d 536, 538-39 (1975). In
dicta, the court of appeals stated that "poor financial circumstances may partially ex-
plain the failure to visit the children even once in five years. Connecticut is a considera-
ble distance from South Carolina." Leone v. Dilullo, 294 S.C. 410, 413, 365 S.E.2d 39, 41
(Ct. App. 1988).
131. See Leone, 294 S.C. at 413, 365 S.E.2d at 41.
132. See id.
133. See Jamison v. Jamison, 285 S.C. 603, 330 S.E.2d 671 (Ct. App. 1985).
134. See id. at 607, 330 S.E.2d at 672-73.
135. See Ginn v. Ginn, 278 S.C. 217, 294 S.E.2d 42 (1982).
136. See Berry v. Ianuario, 286 S.C. 522, 335 S.E.2d 250 (Ct. App. 1985).
137. McCormick v. McMurray, 260 S.C. 452, 456, 196 S.E.2d 642, 644 (1973).
138. See Leone v. Dilullo, 294 S.C. 410, 413, 365 S.E.2d 39, 41 (Ct. App. 1988). See
Hamby v. Hamby, 264 S.C. 614, 618, 216 S.E.2d 536, 538 (1975), where a defending par-
ent claimed his inability to provide support for his child was due to his imprisonment.
The court, unimpressed, stated, "His actions during periods of freedom indicate little, if
any, concern for his child. He . . . voluntarily pursued a course of lawlessness which
[Vol. 40
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necessity, this defense will not suffice. In fact, a defending party
may be responsible for exploring alternative avenues of support
for his children. In Leone v. Dilullo'39 the children resided with
their aunt and uncle. The court cited as evidence of abandon-
ment the mother's failure to seek child support from the father.
Similarly, in Jamison v. Jamison,40 the court cited as evidence
of abandonment a father's failure to seek Social Security insur-
ance benefits for his child as the dependent of a disabled person.
Along with the parent's intent to abandon the child, the
court will examine the best interests of the child before termi-
nating parental rights based on abandonment.14 ' In one in-
stance, the court found that evidence did not support a finding
that the defending parent intended to abandon her child. None-
theless, it considered the mother's "immoral conduct," as con-
trasted with the conduct of children's current custodian.
42
While the court did not terminate the mother's rights, it did
concede that the "argument is not without some appeal.' 1
43
Although the best interests of the child are not addressed in
the statutory definition of abandonment, 4 4 the court, at its dis-
cretion, may fashion its own brand of justice. In Wilson v. Hig-
gins145 the court of appeals stated that the best interest of the
child may be "the primary or paramount consideration" in ter-
mination proceedings. 46 Under Wilson a defending parent must
withstand challenges on two fronts: his conduct must not meet
the statutory definition of abandonment, and the trial judge
cannot view the termination as in the best interests of the child.
Wilson, however, is in discord with the South Carolina Supreme
resulted in his imprisonment and inability to perform his parental duties." Id. at 618,
216 S.E.2d at 538.
139. 294 S.C. 410, 414, 365 S.E.2d 39, 41 (Ct. App. 1988).
140. 285 S.C. 603, 606, 330 S.E.2d 671, 672 (Ct. App. 1985).
141. See Bevis v. Bevis, 254 S.C. 345, 175 S.E.2d 398 (1970). The supreme court
stated that in determining abandonment "the best interest of the child as well as the
rights of parents are involved, and the completeness of the relinquishment of parental
rights to constitute abandonment must be determined upon the basis of due considera-
tion of both." Id. at 351, 175 S.E.2d at 400.
142. See id. at 355, 175 S.E.2d at 402.
143. Id.
144. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1507(1) (Law. Co-op. 1976) (pre-1984 Code); see also
Mann v. Walker, 285 S.C. 194, 328 S.E.2d 659 (Ct. App. 1985).
145. 294 S.C. 300, 305, 363 S.E.2d 911, 914 (Ct. App. 1987) (quoting 43 C.J.S. In-
fants § 40(b) (1978)).
146. See id. at 305, 363 S.E.2d at 914.
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Court's decision in Goff v. Benedict147 and its own ruling in
Hudson v. Blanton.148 In Goff the supreme court stated the
following:
The right of the appellant to her child should not be disre-
garded, and, where she has neither consented to the adoption
nor has forfeited her parental rights by the abandonment of
the child or by any misconduct on her part, the decree of adop-
tion must be refused, even though the adoption would result
in benefits to the child.149
The supreme court's ruling is the better approach. While it
is satisfying on a visceral level to allow the best interest of the
child to be dispositive of every judicial inquiry, such precedent
could have undesirable ramifications. For many newborns, child-
less families who are eager to adopt arguably could provide bet-
ter emotional and financial support for the children. The logical
extension of Wilson could allow the rights of parents whom soci-
ety views as less able to provide for the best interests of the
child to be disregarded in favor of a family who could provide a
more socially acceptable home environment. While the best in-
terests of the child appropriately is the "primary, paramount
and controlling consideration of the court in all child custody
controversies,' 150 this amorphous standard cannot strictly gov-
ern proceedings, which forever terminate parents' liberty inter-
ests in their children. The fluid, unpredictable nature of the best
interest standard is constitutionally flawed, interfering with the
fundamental right of parenthood without articulating a clear
guideline for a defending parent's conduct.
15
147. 252 S.C. 83, 165 S.E.2d 269 (1969).
148. 282 S.C. 70, 316 S.E.2d 432 (Ct. App. 1984).
149. 252 S.C. at 89, 165 S.E.2d at 272 (emphasis added).
150. Cook v. Cobb, 271 S.C. 136, 140, 245 S.E.2d 612, 614 (1978).
151. "Words which are vague and fluid ... may be as much of a trap for the inno-
cent as the ancient laws of Caligula." United States v. Cardiff, 344 U.S. 174, 176 (1952)
(citation omitted). See infra notes 152-279 and accompanying text.
(Vol. 40
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V. THE GREAT MORASS: DECIPHERING THE UNWED FATHER'S
RIGHTS
A. The Supreme Court Offers Some Guidance
No aspect of adoption law possibly is more riddled with
confusion and as potentially volatile than an unwed father's
rights concerning the placement of his child for adoption. For
many years this inquiry received little more than perfunctory at-
tention. Unwed fathers received virtually no constitutional pro-
tection, and courts and legislatures were openly hostile to an al-
leged father's claims of parental rights.1"2 Typically, courts and
legislatures considered unwed fathers ill-suited parents who rou-
tinely ran from paternity suits and responsibilities to their chil-
dren and who should not be allowed to interfere once the birth
mother placed her child for adoption. 5 '
While this approach served the interests of judicial econ-
omy, the unwed father's interests were not well served nor, ar-
guably, were the best interests of the child. In Stanley v. Illi-
nois15 4 the Supreme Court challenged continued reliance on
these long-standing stereotypes, recognizing that an unwed fa-
ther's rights were deserving of constitutional protection.'55 The
Court "emphasized the importance of the family"' 56 and noted
that "[t]he rights to conceive and to raise one's children have
been deemed 'essential,' ,157 and "'basic civil rights of man.' ,158
The Court stated, "'It is cardinal with us that the custody, care,
and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose pri-
mary function and freedom include preparation for obligations
152. See Note, The Unwed Father and the Right to Know of His Child's Existence,
76 Ky. L.J. 949, 949-50 (1987-88).
153. See Washington Post, Nov. 28, 1988, at D16, col. 6.
154. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
155. In Stanley Peter and Joan Stanley lived together intermittently for 18 years.in
a nonmarital relationship. The union produced three children. Upon Joan's death, the
children were placed with court-appointed guardians because Illinois law required chil-
dren of unwed fathers to become wards of the state upon the mother's death. The court
found that Peter's procedural due process rights had been deprived and ordered a hear-
ing on his fitness as a parent before the children could be removed from his custody. See
id. at 649.
156. Id. at 651.
157. Id. (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)).
158. Id. (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)).
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the state can neither supply nor hinder.' 159
In Caban v. Mohammed'"0 the Court expanded Stanley,
stating that "broad, gender-based distinctions [in adoption stat-
utes are not] required by any universal difference between ma-
ternal and paternal relations at every phase of a child's
development."I'
The protections announced in Stanley and Caban were not,
however, unconditional. In Quillion v. Walcott I6 2 and Lehr v.
Robertson16 3 the Court explored the limits of an unwed father's
rights. In these two cases, the unwed fathers' relationships with
the children were less substantial than those implicated in Stan-
ley or Caban. The Court termed this difference "both clear and
significant,' 16 4 announcing that an unwed father's interest in his
child merits constitutional protection only in "appropriate
cases."''  The Court stressed that "the rights of the parents are
a counterpart of the responsibilities they have assumed" 66 and
an inextricable linkage exists between "parental duty and paren-
tal right[s]. '' 167 The Court explained that "[w]hen an unwed fa-
159. Id. (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166, reh'g denied, 321 U.S.
804 (1944)).
160. 441 U.S. 380 (1978). Obdiel Caban and Maria Mohammed lived in a nonmarital
relationship for five years. The relationship produced two children. Caban contributed to
the children's support, was listed as the father on their birth certificates, and lived with
them as their father. Mohammed left Caban, remarried, and petitioned for the adoption
of the children. Caban cross-petitioned to adopt the children. The New York statute
held that only the mother's consent was required for adoption of an illegitimate child;
the father's consent was not necessary. Mohammed, therefore, could block Caban's peti-
tion for adoption although Caban could not. This gender-based distinction was found to
violate the equal protection clause. See infra notes 248-266 and accompanying text.
161. Id. at 389.
162. 434 U.S. 246, reh'g denied, 435 U.S. 918 (1978). In Quijoin an unwed father
attempted to block the adoption of his biological child. Quilloin and the unwed mother,
Walcott, had "never married each other or established a home together." Id. at 247.
Quilloin provided irregular support to his child, and visits had a "disruptive effect on the
child." Id. at 251. Further, for over eleven years, Quilloin had not sought to legitimize his
child.
163. 463 U.S. 248 (1982). Lehr and Robertson lived together for approximately two
years in a nonmarital relationship. Following birth of the child, Lehr neither lived with
Robertson nor provided financial support to either Robertson or the child. Additionally,
and of great significance to the Court, Lehr did not enter his name in New York State's
putative father registry. See id. at 251.
164. Id. at 261.
165. Id. at 256.
166. Id. at 257.
167. Id.
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ther demonstrates a full commitment to the responsibilities of
parenthood by 'com[ing] forward to participate in the rearing of
his child,"16 8 the Constitution requires substantial protection of
this interest."'
16 9
The Court cautioned that "the mere existence of a biologi-
cal link does not merit equivalent constitutional protection."' 70
"'[T]he importance of the familial relationship, to the individu-
als involved and to the society, stems from the emotional attach-
ments that derive from the intimacy of daily association, . . as
well as from the fact of blood relationship.' ""7 The Court sum-
marized its position as follows:
The significance of the biological connection is that it offers
the natural father an opportunity that no other male possesses
to develop a relationship with his offspring. If he grasps that
opportunity and accepts some measure of responsibility for the
child's future, he may enjoy the blessings of the parent-child
relationship and make uniquely valuable contributions to the
child's development. If he fails to do so, the Federal Constitu-
tion will not automatically compel a State to listen to his opin-
ion of where the child's best interests lie." 2
B. The South Carolina Statute
These constitutional principles are, to varying degrees, re-
flected in the Adoption Act. Before analyzing those provisions
which are constitutionally suspect, an overview of the relevant
provisions of the statute is required.
Two sections of the Act directly concern a father's rights
regarding the adoption of his child. First, section 20-7-1690113
mandates those persons from whom consent to an adoption is
required and then section 20-7-1734174 governs those persons en-
titled to notice of adoption proceedings.
168. Id. at 261 (quoting Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 392 (1979)).
169. See id. at 261.
170. Id.
171. Id. (quoting Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform,
431 U.S. 816, 844 (1977) (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231-33 (1972))).
172. Id. at 262 (footnote omitted).
173. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1690 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988).
174. Id. § 20-7-1734.
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1. Consent: Section 20-7-1690
The statute takes a tiered approach to determining whose
consent to adoption is required. The child's legitimacy and the
age of the child at the time of adoption determine these tiers.
The statute contemplates four categories of fathers:
(1) fathers who conceive a child while married to the birth
mother;
(2) fathers who are married to the birth mother at the time
of the child's birth;
(3) unwed fathers of children to be placed for adoption
more than six months after birth;
(4) unwed fathers of children to be placed for adoption six
months or less after birth.
Section 20-7-1690(A)(2) addresses the first two categories.
17 5
This section requires consent from the "parents . . .of a child
conceived or born during the marriage of the parents. 1 76 Absent
a showing of a father's unfitness, the father enjoys the same
rights as the birth mother under this provision. The biological
father effectively can block an adoption regardless of the
mother's consent.
The statute specifies a two-part test for the third category
of father.'7 Unlike the father who was married to the birth
mother at time of conception or birth, the father of a child con-
ceived and born outside of wedlock must satisfy the court that
his interest in the child is so substantial that his consent to
adoption should be required. The section states that the father
of a child to be placed for adoption more than six months after
the child's birth must have "maintained substantial and contin-
uous or repeated contact with the child."' This contact is
demonstrated by "payment by the father toward the support of
the child of a fair and reasonable sum, based on the father's fi-
nancial ability."' 9 In addition, the biological father must satisfy
one of two other requirements. He must either visit 80 the child
at least monthly, when he is physically and financially able and
175. See id. § 20-7-1690(A)(2).
176. Id.
177. See id. § 20-7-1690(A)(4).
178. Id.
179, Id. § 20-7-1690(A)(4)(a).
180. See id. § 20-7-1690(A)(4)(b).
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when he is not prevented from visiting by the custodian, or he
must regularly communicate with the child. 8'
The statute requires an objective evaluation of the father's
behavior. His "subjective intent . . . if unsupported by evi-
dence"182 of these acts is not controlling. The statute, however,
does carve out one exception to the requirement of "substantial
and continuous or repeated contact."8 3 A father who Jives with
the child for six months within the one-year period immediately
preceding placement and who openly holds himself out as the
father of the child will satisfy the substantial and continuous
contact requirement. Therefore, these live-in fathers are treated
the same under the statute as fathers in categories one and two
discussed above.
Consent is required from the fourth category of father -
unwed fathers of children placed for adoption within six months
of birth - if he fulfills one of two requirements.5 First, the
father must have lived with the birth mother or child continu-
ously for six months and have held himself out to be the child's
father.1
8 5
Second, if the father fails to satisfy this requirement, his
consent is nevertheless required if he has paid a fair and reason-
able sum, based on his financial ability, for the child's support,
expenses incurred in connection with the mother's pregnancy, or
expenses from the birth of the child. 88 The Act, therefore, re-
quires the father's consent if he paid the birth mother's preg-
nancy expenses, but did not contribute to the expenses incurred
during delivery or the child's support and did not visit the child
for six months. Moreover, the "fair and reasonable sum" lan-
guage in the statute refers to the amount paid in any one of the
three categories of expenses outlined in section 20-7-
1690(A)(5)(b). If the father paid the entire amount of one of the
three categories, he need not contribute a fair and reasonable
sum toward the other two categories.
181. See id. § 20-7-1690(A)(4)(c).
182. Id. § 20-7-1690(A)(4). But see S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1572(4) (Law. Co-op.
1976) (requiring "willful" abandonment).
183. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1690(A)(4) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988).
184. See id. 20-7-1690(A)(5)(a). Note that the father need not live continuously
with the child for six months.
185. See id.
186. See id. § 20-7-1690(A)(5)(b).
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If the father's consent is required, only termination of his
parental rights 117 or proof of his mental incapacity'" can over-
come this requirement. When the attorney secures the father's
consent using the same punctilious procedures used to obtain
the birth mother's consent, the adoption can go forward.18 9 As
discussed previously, the father's interest in his child reaches
constitutional dimensions, and the precise statutory require-
ments for informed, voluntary consent must be followed. As with
the birth mother, the contents of the father's consent are speci-
fied by statute90 and the two-witness requirement also is in
force.19'
2. Notice: Section 20-7-1734
Section 20-7-1734 requires that notice of adoption proceed-
ings must be given to several classifications of persons."' If a
father has consented to an adoption, no further contact is re-
quired.1' 3 On the other hand, if a father's consent was not re-
quired under section 20-7-1690, he must be given notice of the
proceedings194 by personal service of summons. 9 5 Notice may be
effected by publication, if personal service is not possible, or in a
manner the court allows. 96
The notice must state that the father has thirty days to re-
spond by filing his notice of intent to "contest, intervene, or oth-
erwise respond"'9 and that his failure to respond within this
187. See id. § 20-7-1695(A)(1). See supra notes 113-151 and accompanying text.
188. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1695(A)(2) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988).
189. See id. § 20-7-1734(A).
190. See id. § 20-7-1700.
191. See id. § 20-7-1705.
192. See id. § 20-7-1734(B)(1)-(7). Of particular note is subsection (B)(2), which re-
quires notice of "any person . . .required to give consent ... pursuant to [§ 20-7-
1690(A) or (B)] from whom consent. . . cannot be obtained." Id. § 20-7-1734(B)(2). The
language "from whom consent. . . cannot be obtained" is misleading. This section does
not require notice to fathers who refuse to give their consent to an adoption; their re-
fusal, of course, terminates the adoption proceeding. The section pertains to fathers who,
though entitled to give consent, cannot be located. See Telephone interview with Ms.
Ann Cushman, Former Director of Research, Joint Legislative Committee on Children
and staff to committee that adopted Adoption Act (June 27, 1989).
193. See S.C. CoDE ANN. §§ 20-7-1734(A), (B)(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988).
194. See id. § 20-7-1734(B)(3).
195. See id. § 20-7-1734(D).
196. See id.
197. Id. § 20-7-1734(E)(1).
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time constitutes consent. 98 If the father responds within thirty
days, he is afforded "an opportunity to appear and to be heard
before the final hearing on the merits of the adoption."'1 9 Al-
though the statute does not define what standard the court shall
apply to the father's argument, apparently he must prove that
the adoption is not in the best interests of the child. 00 If the
father fails the consent requirement of section 20-7-1690, the no-
tice requirement of section 20-7-1734 does not offer him a bright
prospect of gaining custody of his child.21
C. Constitutional Implications
To the drafters' credit, the Act sets forth some bright lines
and objective standards by which a father's rights may be deter-
mined. Although this gives some certainty as to the father's
rights, attorneys still should proceed with caution. The Supreme
198. See id. § 20-7-1734(E)(3).
199. See id. § 20-7-1734.
200. Traditionally, a parent's rights regarding a child are measured by only two
standards: the fitness standard which is used in terminating parental rights, see supra
notes 113-151 and accompanying text, and the best interests standard that is used in
child custody proceedings. See Cook v. Cobb, 271 S.C. 136, 140, 245 S.E.2d 612, 614
(1978). The statute apparently does not contemplate the fitness standard because a fa-
ther's failure to satisfy the requirements of S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1690 (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1988), in itself is a virtual restatement of the TPR statute, the statute by which
fitness is judged. Therefore, a father's failure to satisfy § 20-7-1690 almost certainly
would predict failure at the notice hearing if the fitness standard were employed.
One may argue that the notice hearing is provided solely to determine whether a
father meets the strict requirement of § 20-7-1690, and if he does not satisfy the require-
ments, the father may not contest the adoption. This interpretation, however, is not sup-
ported by the statute. The notice hearing section expressly provides that notice must be
provided "the father of a child whose consent . . . is not required" under § 20-7-1690.
See § 20-7-1734(B)(3). Therefore, the notice hearing statute assumes that the notice
hearing is provided for another reason other than determining whether § 20-7-1690 is
satisfied. Thus, the only logical purpose of the notice hearing is to provide a father the
opportunity to argue that, despite his failure to satisfy § 20-7-1690, the adoption is not
in the best interests of the child. This interpretation was, in fact, the intent of the stat-
ute's drafters. See Telephone interview with Ms. Anne Cushman, former Director of Re-
search, Joint Legislative Committee on Children and staff to committee that drafted the
Adoption Act (June 27, 1989).
201. Despite the father's biological link, proving that the adoption is not in the best
interests of the child is a rigorous standard. Often, the father is unmarried and cannot
offer the stable and economically secure environment that the adoptive couple possess.
Although a matter of judicial discretion, the father's burden is especially great if he has
already failed the consent requirement of S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1690 (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1988).
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Court has not squarely addressed the full dimensions of the fa-
ther's rights respecting a child placed for adoption. The follow-
ing are constitutional attacks a father might successfully make
against the Act.
1. Due Process
The fourteenth amendment states that "[n]o State shall
...deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law. ' 20 2 As previously noted, the father's interest in
the care, custody, and rearing of his child is protected under the
due process clause regardless of his marital status. °s Section 20-
7-1690(A)(5) 204 of the Act is most vulnerable to due process at-
tack. This section addresses the requirements for obtaining a fa-
ther's consent prior to adoption of a child six months old or less,
the fourth category of father outlined above, who receives only
limited protection.20 5 The notice requirement 2 6 provides merely
for "an opportunity to appear and to be heard before the final
hearing on the merits of adoption. 2 07 While this hearing satis-
fies a father's right to procedural due process, forcing a father to
satisfy a best interests standard in many cases effectively nulli-
fies his ability to adopt. From this substantive due process van-
tage point, the statute is constitutionally suspect.
208
a. Due Process Protection for Fathers Who Do Not Know of
the Existence of Their Child.
The statute states that the father must have "paid a fair
and reasonable sum"20 in order for his consent to an adoption
to be required. If the father was unaware of the child's existence
prior to the notice hearing, he cannot block the adoption by
202. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
203. See supra notes 152-172 and accompanying text.
204. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1690(A)(5) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988).
205. See supra notes 184-186 and accompanying text.
206. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1734 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988).
207. Id.
208. Substantive due process "bars certain arbitrary governmental actions regard-
less of the fairness of the proceedings used to implement them." See Daniels v. Williams,
474 U.S. 327, 337 (Stevens, J., concurring), aff'd, 474 U.S. 344 (1986).
209. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1690(A)(5)(b) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988) (emphasis
added).
[Vol. 40
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withholding his consent even if he arrives at the hearing ready,
willing, and able to offer the requisite financial and emotional
support. Instead, he faces the more difficult "best interests of
the child" standard imposed at the notice hearing. Even in situ-
ations where a father's consent is required under section 20-7-
1690, the statute allows an adoption to go forward absent that
consent if the father cannot be located and does not respond to
the notice of the adoption within thirty days.21°
A father seeking custody and care of his child could argue
that the requirements set forth in section 20-7-1690 outlining
when a father's consent is necessary, and the "constructive con-
sent" aspects of section 20-7-1734, violate his right of substan-
tive due process if he does not know of the existence of the
child. Under this theory, the father could assert that before a
court eliminates his liberty interest in his child, he has the right
to establish a parent-child relationship.21
No South Carolina or Supreme Court case addresses this is-
sue. Lehr v. Robertson,1 2 however, held that a father's liberty
interest in his child must be protected if he "grasps that oppor-
tunity and accepts some measure of responsibility for the child's
future." His failure to seize this opportunity denies him this pro-
tection.21 '3  The Supreme Court decision failed to consider
210. See id. § 20-7-1734(E)(3). The statute provides that failure to respond to the
notice within thirty days constitutes "consent to adoption." Id. The statute is unclear in
a situation when a father whose consent is required under section 20-7-1690, but who
could not be located prior to receiving the notice of the adoption proceeding, comes for-
ward to block the adoption. The statute affords him only the same "opportunity to ap-
pear and to be heard" that a father is afforded whose consent is not required under this
statute. See id. Whether a best interest standard will be applied or whether the father at
this time may refuse to grant his consent, thereby blocking the adoption, is unclear. To
determine that a father's consent is required under section 20-7-1690, yet demand that
he meet a harsher accountability under section 20-7-1734 solely because the parties to
the adoption were unable to locate the father before the notice proceeding seems incon-
sistent. One way to reconcile this dichotomy is to allow the "opportunity to appear"
language to demand different standards of judicial review depending on the degree of the
father's liberty interests in his child. See supra note 200.
211. This argument is also viable for those fathers who attempt to block an adop-
tion of a child older than six months. Regardless of the child's age, the father may argue
this point when he fails to meet the statutory requirements of § 20-7-1690 because he did
not know the child existed. On the other hand, because of the father's enhanced oppor-
tunity to learn of the existence of an older child, this argument is most effective under
the provisions of section 20-7-1690(A)(5).
212. 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1982).
213. See id. at 262.
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"whether a. . . father could be deprived of that opportunity in
the first place. '214 Further, the Court stated that "[w]hen an un-
wed father demonstrates a full commitment to the responsibili-
ties of parenthood by 'com[ing] forward to participate in the
rearing of his child,' . . . his interest in personal contact with his
child requires substantial protection under the Due Process
Clause."2 15 Some commentators argue that "the right to know
[of the child's existence] is a necessary prerequisite to the op-
portunity to develop a protective relationship between the fa-
ther and the child. '216 Arguably, notice by publication is not suf-
ficient to alert a father that his opportunity to "enjoy the
blessings of the parent-child relationship" is terminated.
21 7
In a letter to Family Court Judge Robert R. Mallard, Assis-
tant South Carolina Attorney General B. J. Willoughby ad-
dressed this problem. 18 The Attorney General determined that
the father was on constructive notice of the child's existence be-
cause of his sexual relations with the birth mother stating: "He
does become aware of the possibility that his actions may result
in the conception of a child.
'219
Even if conceded that a father must accept responsibility
for his sexual activity by imposing a duty on him to investigate
the consequences of his actions, a difficult situation arises when
the birth mother thwarts the father's efforts to learn of her preg-
nancy. Certainly, a father's interest should not be terminated if,
although exercising due diligence, he is unable to locate the
birth mother or learn of her condition.220 A birth mother simply
may refuse to identify the father 22 1 or offer a straw man to sign
214. Note, supra note 152, at 977.
215. 463 U.S. at 261 (quoting Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 392 (1982)) (cita-
tion omitted).
216. Note, supra note 152, at 988.
217. 463 U.S. at 262.
218, See Letter from South Carolina Assistant Attorney General B.J. Willoughby to
Family Court Judge Robert R. Mallard (Oct. 13, 1981). Willoughby focused on the prob-
lem of an "alleged father [who] did not come forward because he was unaware of the
pregnancy." Id.
219. Id.
220. To avoid public notoriety, birth mothers often leave their hometowns for sev-
eral months prior to birth of their children. Upon a birth mother's return, the child
could have already been placed for adoption and the father's hopes of blocking the adop-
tion effectively thwarted.
221. A myriad of reasons could underlie a birth mother's refusal to name the father,
such as: (1) the father may be married and the birth mother seeks to protect both of
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the consent form, claiming him as the father of the child.2 22 If a
father, despite this subterfuge, discovers the birth and comes
forward at the time of the notice hearing, it would be a violation
of substantive due process to force him to meet a best interests
standard when he is able and willing to "grasp that opportunity
and accept . . . responsibility for his child's future." '223
The Supreme Court stated that a father does not have a
constitutionally protected interest if he does "not accept[ ] some
measure of responsibility for the child's future,' 2 4 but the fa-
ther's constitutional interests cannot be dismissed if he has done
everything in his power to come forward and "grasp that oppor-
tunity. 22 5 Assistant Attorney General Willoughby's reasoning is
more persuasive in a situation when, after exhaustive efforts, the
father's identity or whereabouts are unknown and the adoption
must proceed.228 On the other hand, when the birth mother con-
ceals her pregnancy from the father, his interest should be pro-
tected, rather than subjected to the more difficult notice hearing
standard before he may intervene.2 2
b. Due Process Protection for the Father Who Fails to Live
With or Contribute Toward the Birth Mother and Child
Even if the father knew of the pregnancy, the consent re-
quirements of section 20-7-1690 are subject to substantive due
them from public embarrassment; (2) the birth mother may have been jilted by the fa-
ther and does not want to be reminded of the relationship; (3) she may be embarrassed
by her promiscuity and does not want to admit to the casualness of the child's concep-
tion; or (4) she may not want to risk the father's intervention into the adoption process.
222. Adoption attorneys may fear that straw men, friends of the birth mother will-
ing to pose as the father, often are named. Additionally, some attorneys may fear that
birth mothers sometime allege rape, thereby avoiding the consent requirement under
S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1734(C) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988).
223. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983).
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Admittedly, at some point the adoption proceedings cannot be further delayed
in hopes of the father's appearance. At this time, after all available procedures for noti-
fying the father have been exhausted, offsetting concerns of delay in securing a home for
the child bolster this "constructive notice" argument. See infra notes 242-246 and ac-
companying text.
227. One commentator proposes enactment of a statute under which a birth
mother's refusal to name the father, if within her knowledge, would subject her to "im-
prisonment for a period not to exceed [two years], become criminally liable for a sum not
to exceed [$5,000], or both." Note, supra note 152, at 1003 n.407.
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process attack. The Act mandates that the father must live with
the birth mother or child for six months immediately preceding
the adoption"" or contribute toward the expenses of the birth
mother or child.22 9 Standing alone, this first requirement seems
patently unconstitutional. Certainly, the State cannot dictate
with whom the father must live in order to protect his liberty
interest in his child.
23 0
Furthermore, a father's refusal to contribute to prenatal
care or expenses associated with the birth should not deprive
him of his liberty interest in his child. The birth father has no
cognizable interest in his child prior to birth. The Supreme
Court denies him a right to veto his wife's abortion,231 and the
Court describes a woman's decision of whether to bear a child as
"the right of the individual. '2 32 Given the individualistic nature
of the birth mother's liberty interest in the fetus, a father may
claim that the State cannot impose a duty towards a fetus when
the law grants him no commensurate right. His obligations must
begin only at the birth of the child,233 and therefore, the require-
ments of section 20-7-1690(5)(A) violate his substantive due pro-
cess rights. When a father comes forward to block the adoption
of an infant child, he is demonstrating "a full commitment to
the responsibilities of parenthood" at the earliest possible mo-
ment, and his liberty interest in his child therefore "acquires
substantial protection under the Due Process Clause.
'23 4
228. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1690(5)(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988).
229. See id. § 20-7-1690(5)(b).
230. "[F]reedom to marry the person of one's choice is 'one of the vital personal
rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness.'" L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 415 (2d ed. 1988) (quoting Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967)). Equally
vital is a person's right to choose not to marry. Cf. Bodie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371
(1971) (marriage and divorce are such fundamental rights that indigents cannot be
charged a fee to obtain a divorce).
231. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
232. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (emphasis in original).
233. Arguably, a father's obligation may begin in the third trimester of pregnancy,
when the woman's right over the fetus gives way to recognition of a compelling state
interest in the child. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, reh'g denied, 410 U.S. 959 (1973).
234. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983).
[Vol. 40
38
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 3 [], Art. 8
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol40/iss3/8
SOUTH CAROLINA ADOPTION LAW
D. Summary of Due Process Attack on the South Carolina
Adoption Statute and Proposed Statutory Solutions
When a child is born, the father has an "inchoate" '235 right
in that child which receives constitutional protection only if he
strives to develop the "parent-child relationship. 2 36 If the fa-
ther is unaware of his child's existence, he is not allowed the
opportunity to transfer this inchoate right into a relationship
deserving constitutional protection. Therefore, the consent re-
quirements of section 20-7-1690 violate substantive due process
if they deny him this opportunity. Further, in the case of an in-
fant adoption, even if the father knows of the pregnancy and has
failed to live with the birth mother or child or contribute toward
their support, a father cannot be denied the opportunity to de-
velop the parent-child relationship. The father has no cognizable
interest in the fetus; therefore, his obligation to the child must
commence at birth.237 Thus, section 20-7-1734 also may violate
the father's substantive due process rights if it imposes prepar-
turition obligations on the father.
The only alternative available to a father under this statute
is to appear at the notice hearing and "be heard before the final
hearing on the merits of the adoption. '23 8 The adoption statute
is silent as to the weight a family court judge should place on
the father's effort to block an adoption and seek custody. A fa-
ther may argue that a best interest standard should not be ap-
plied. Instead, the father should be allowed to block an adoption
simply upon a showing of fitness.
Obviously, at some moment, if the father fails to intervene,
although unaware of the existence of the child, his interest in
the child must give way to the child's best interests. The familial
relationship that develops between a child and his adoptive par-
ents deserves deference. One commentator suggests that the
Court has recognized "the desirability of preserving family units
already in existence and allow[ing] the value of what might be
called a 'complete,' if artificially created family unit to trump
the value of the biological father's relationship with the
235. Id. at 261 n.17.
236. Id. at 261.
237. See supra notes 231-234 and accompanying text.
238. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1734(E) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988).
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child."23 9 In fact, the Supreme Court noted that "biological rela-
tionships are not exclusive determination[s] of the existence of a
family.
'240
These statements by the Court and South Carolina's strong
public policy in favor of adoption 241 combine to militate in favor
of securing some ascertainable date after which the father's
unexercised interest gives way to the child's interest, the adop-
tive parents' interest, and the state's interest in finality of court
proceedings. The following are suggested changes to accomplish
this end and secure the biological father's substantive due pro-
cess rights:
(1) In section 20-7-1690(A)(5), the words "but only if"
should be repealed. Section 20-7-1690(5)(a) and (b) should be
repealed in their entirety.
(2) Section 20-7-1734(D) should be amended to read as
follows:
Any person or agency entitled to notice pursuant to this sec-
tion must be given notice that adoption proceedings have been
initiated. Notice must be given in the manner prescribed by
law for personal service of summons in civil actions. The best
efforts of the parties to an adoption, including the birth
mother, adoptive parents, and the guardian ad litem, must be
used to effect this notice. If notice cannot be effected by per-
sonal service, notice may be given by publication or by the
manner the court decides will provide notice. 42
(3) The language following section 20-7-1734(E)(3) should
be amended to read as follows:
When notice of intent to contest, intervene, or otherwise re-
spond is filed with the Court within the required time period, a
person or agency whose consent or relinquishment is not re-
quired under § 20-7-1690 must be given an opportunity to ap-
pear and be heard, before the final hearing on the merits of the
adoption, as to the best interests of the child.
When notice of intent to contest, intervene, or otherwise re-
spond is filed with the Court within the required time period, a
239. L. TRIBE, supra note 230, at 1417 n.24.
240. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S.
816, 843 (1977).
241. See supra notes 9-17 and accompanying text.
242. The italized portion of the statute indicates the proposed amendments.
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person or agency whose consent or relinquishment is required
under § 20-7-1690 must be given an opportunity to appear and
be heard before the final hearing on the merits of the adoption,
and may at that time withhold consent and thereby terminate
the adoption proceedings.
When actual notice of the adoption proceedings is not given a
person or agency whose consent or relinquishment is required
under § 20-7-1690, that person or agency may intervene at any
time prior to the final adoption decree and may at that time
withhold consent and thereby terminate the adoption
proceedings.243
This amendment undoubtedly would be criticized for giving
a father the right to veto an adoption over the birth mother's
wishes. One commentator noted that the decision to place a
child for adoption "is almost always a difficult one, made possi-
ble only by the mother's conviction that she is doing what is best
for the child. For many unwed mothers, knowing that the child's
father might successfully challenge the adoption could make her
decision traumatic."244 One fear is that mothers may "keep their
babies if there is any uncertainty surrounding immediate and fi-
nal adoption placement.
2 45
These arguments are unpersuasive; a father's liberty inter-
est in his child should not be cast aside simply to allow a birth
mother to feel more comfortable in her decision to allow adop-
tion. True, the birth mother's uncertainty as to the prospect of
the father gaining custody of her child may affect her decision to
offer consent. Nevertheless, a simple procedure would protect
both a father's rights and a birth mother's need for certainty:
secure the father's consent prior to granting her own consent.
Not only would this allow the mother's decision to be unencum-
bered by concerns about the father's intervention into the adop-
tion process, but it would be an effective incentive for birth
mothers to reveal the father's identity to the court. 46 If the
243. The statute mandates that "[t]he final hearing on the adoption petition must
not be held before 90 days and no later than six months after the filing of the adoption
petition." S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1760(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988). After the final de-
cree, the consent, actual or constructive, is irrevocable. See id. § 20-7-1720.
244. Note, The Punative Father's Due Process Rights to Notice and a Hearing,
1986 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1081, 1093-94 (citations omitted).
245. Id. at 1094 n.47.
246. See supra notes 220-227 and accompanying text.
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birth mother still chooses not to identify the father, she bears
the risk that the father may intervene. In short, this reformed
adoption scheme balances the interests of all parties concerned
and refuses to recognize the historical stereotypes that charac-
terize fathers as "invariably less qualified and entitled than
mothers to exercise a concerned judgment as to the fate of their
children."
'247
2. Equal Protection
The Adoption Act, sections 20-7-1690(A)(1)-(4), is also vul-
nerable to an equal protection attack.248 The statute states that
consent is required of any mother who was unmarried at the
child's birth.2 49 Conversely, the statute requires the father have
"substantial and continuous '250 contact wih the child in order
for his consent to be required. In short, the statute draws a gen-
der-based classification that may deprive men of their parental
rights.
The Supreme Court repeatedly has held that gender-based
distinctions must meet "the burden of showing an 'exceedingly
persuasive justification' for the classification. '"2 51 Further, status
distinctions between unwed mothers and unwed fathers "'must
serve important governmental objectives and must be substan-
tially related to achievement of those objectives' in order to
withstand judicial scrutiny under the Equal Protection
Clause.
,252
In Caban v. Mohammed253 the Court addressed the issue of
disparate treatment between unwed fathers and unwed mothers
in adoption proceedings. The New York statute under attack
provided the following: "[C]onsent to adoption shall be required
as follows: . . . (b) Of the parents or surviving parent, whether
adult or infant, of a child born in wedlock; [and] (c) Of the
247. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 394 (1979).
2,18. "No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec-
tion of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
249. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1690(A)(3) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988).
250. Id. § 20-7-1690(A)(4).
251. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (quoting
Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 461 (1981)).
252. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 388 (1979) (quoting Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190, 197 (1976), reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 1124 (1977)).
253. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
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mother, whether adult or infant, of a child born out of wedlock
,,254
Further, the New York statute made parental consent unneces-
sary "where the parent has abandoned or relinquished his or her
rights in the child or has been adjudicated incompetent to care
for the child. 2 55 Under the statute, the unwed mother could
block the adoption, yet the unwed father had "no simliar control
over the fate of his child, even when his parental relationship
[was] substantial." '56
The Court found that the statute violated the unwed fa-
ther's equal protection right despite the birth mother's attempts
to justify the statute's disparate treatment. First, the birth
mother argued that "'a natural mother, absent special circum-
stances, bears a closer relationship with her child .. .than a
father does.' ,,25 The Court rejected this contention.
The birth mother next argued that one justification for dif-
ferential treatment rested on the State's interest in promoting
adoption of nonmarital children.25 Again, the Court summarily
dismissed this argument.260
The Court acknowledged that "special difficulties attendant
upon locating and identifying unwed fathers at birth [may] jus-
tify a legislative distinction between mothers and fathers of
newborns, but these difficulties need not persist past infancy. '21
The Court went on to state that "[w]hen the adoption of an
older child is sought, the State's interest in proceeding with
254. Id. at 385 (quoting N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 111 (McKinney 1977)).
255. Id.
256. Id. at 386-87.
257. Id. at 388 (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument, at 41).
258. See id. at 389. The Court noted that the "present case demonstrates that an
unwed father may have a relationship with his children fully comparable to that of the
mother." The Court held that "gender-based" distinctions are not "required by any uni-
versal difference between maternal and paternal relations at every phase of a child's de-
velopment." Id.
259. See id. at 391.
260. See id. The Court noted that the statute did not "bear a substantial relation to
the State's interest in providing adoptive homes for its illegitimate children." Id. While
the Court recognized that some unwed fathers would attempt to prevent the adoption of
their illegitimate children, "[t]his impediment to adoption usually is the result of a natu-
ral parental interest shared by both genders alike; it is not a manifestation of any
profound difference between the affection and concern of mothers and fathers for their
children."
261. Id. at 392 (footnote omitted).
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adoption cases can be protected by means that do not draw such
an inflexible gender-based distinction.
2 62
The father must concede that the Court allows gender-
based discrimination based on a woman's unique ability to give
birth.26 3 Further, he must concede that "[q]uite apart from the
physical experience of pregnancy itself, an experience which of
course has no analogue to the male, there is the attachment the
experience creates, partly physiological and partly psychological,
between mother and child. '26 4 As Caban mandates, however, the
Court will not condone these distinctions after the reasons for
the gender distinction cease to exist.
The "similarly situated" argument wains with each passing
month after the child's birth. Therefore, the requirements
placed on unwed fathers of children older than six months must
satisfy the test of being substantially related to important gov-
ernmental interests. The Caban court already noted that these
governmental objectives do not exist.2 65 The distinction only fur-
thers outdated sexual stereotypes of the unwed father whose fa-
milial concern for his child is suspect and his contribution to the
child's welfare, sparse. The following commentary develops this
point:
[N]o reason exists, outside of social custom and stereotyped
notions of the proper roles for women and men to support a
gender-based distinction in parental rights and obligations. It
does not serve the needs of women, men, or - most impor-
tantly of children - to presume that either gender has a mo-
nopoly on nurturance, love, concern, or the willingness to sup-
port and care for children. An official presumption that unwed
fathers are uninterested, however, can surely help to create or
perpetuate such a result. Indeed, the judicial exclusion of fa-
thers from the full parental rights has been said to contribute
to the anger and resentment of some fathers and to leave, how-
ever unjustifiably, to an unwillingness to participate in child
rearing when offered the opportunity and to a high rate of de-
linquency in payment of child support even when Court
ordered.
266
262. Id.
263. See Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
264. L. TRIBE, supra note 230, at 1340.
265. See supra notes 253-264 and accompanying text.
266. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union and the ACLU
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The South Carolina Act, as with the statute implicated in
Caban, requires the consent of parents of a child born in wed-
lock.287 Also, like the New York statute, the birth mother must
always consent.268 The statutes, however, differ in that New
York never requires the consent of an unwed father, although
the South Carolina statute requires his consent, but only if he
has maintained "substantial and continuous" contact with the
child. 9 Some may argue that this distinction should save the
South Carolina statute from constitutional attack. After all, the
Court in Caban stressed that "where the father never has come
forward to participate in the rearing of his child, nothing in the
Equal Protection Clause precludes the State from withholding
from him the privilege of vetoing the adoption of that child.
' '2
7
0
Arguably, the hurdles placed in the path of the unwed father
under the South Carolina statute simply define what acts consti-
tute the required participation by the father in rearing the child.
What this argument fails to recognize is that the unwed
mother also may fail to exercise the requisite degree of interest
in her child, yet she bears no commensurate responsibility for
demonstrating that interest. Caban clearly stated that "maternal
and paternal roles are not invariably different in importance. 2 71
To allow "overbroad generalizations ' 27 2 to dictate the rights of
unwed fathers in adoptive proceedings "excludes some loving fa-
thers from full participation in the decision whether their chil-
dren will be adopted and, at the same time, enables some alien-
ated mothers arbitrarily to cut off the paternal rights of the
fathers. '273 Therefore, though the state may withhold the privi-
lege of vetoing an adoption from either parent if that parent has
failed to "come forward and participate in the rearing of [the]
child, '274 this determination cannot be based only on the fa-
ther's conduct and allow a mother's participation to be pre-
of San Diego and Imperial Counties in Support of Appellant, in McNamara v. County of
San Diego, Department of Social Services, No. 87-5840.
267. See id. § 20-7-1690(A)(2).
268. See id. § 20-7-1690(A)(3).
269. See id. § 20-7-1690(A)(4).
270. 441 U.S. 380, 392 (1979).
271. Id. at 389.
272. Id. at 394 (citing Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 211 (1977)).
273. Id. (emphasis added).
274. Id. at 392.
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sumptively sufficient.
Although neither statute requires the parents' consent if
their parental rights have been terminated,27 5 an unwed father
still must leap the additional hurdle of section 20-7-1690. This
disparate treatment is compounded because requirements for
showing abandonment under section 20-7-1572 are greater than
the requirements necessary for a father's consent to be denied
under section 20-7-1690.176
Just as the justifications for the disparate treatment be-
tween unwed fathers and unwed mothers in Caban failed judi-
cial scrutiny, so must any justifications for the South Carolina
classifications. Therefore, to avoid equal protection attack on
section 20-7-1690, the following amendments are proposed:
(1) Section 20-7-1690(A)(3) should be amended to read as
follows: "The mother of a child born when the mother was not
married."
(2) Section 20-7-1690(A)(4)(a)-(c) should be amended to
read: "The father of a child born when the father was not mar-
ried to the child's mother, if the child was placed with the pro-
spective adoptive parents more than six months after the child's
birth."1
2 77
These legislative amendments, if adopted, would continue
to further the legislative purpose of the Adoption Act by estab-
lishing "fair and reasonable procedures for the adoption of chil-
dren. '27 8 Moreover, these amendments would rebuke the "over-
broad generalizations21 7 9 that serve only to perpetuate archaic
stereotypes of the proper roles of men and women in familial
relationships.
275. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1695(A)(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988).
276. See supra notes 113-151 and accompanying text, outlining the statutes require-
ment of "willful" abandonment as juxtaposed with the adoption statute's refusal to rec-
ognize the father's "subjective intent." S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1690(A) (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1988).
277. The Court has expressed "no view whether . . . a statute addressed particu-
larly to newborn adoptions, setting forth more stringent requirements concerning the
acknowledgment of paternity or a stricter definition for abandonment" would survive an
equal protection attack. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 392 n.11 (1979). Therefore,
the suggested statutory changes would not repeal § 20-7-1690(A)(5). As previously dis-
cussed, see supra notes 202-247 and accompanying text, this section is vulnerable to a
due process attack.
278. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1647 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988).
279. 441 U.S. at 394.
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VI. ENTER THE MIDDLEMAN: THE BABY BROKER
As the South Carolina General Assembly began considering
legislation in the wake of the state's notorious national atten-
tion, Francis Lewis, the Executive Director of the Children's Bu-
reau of South Carolina admitted that "[w]e are aware of very
few outright cash payments for children."280 He did, however,
acknowledge the presence of a more rampant and subtly invidi-
ous practice: people making substantial profit as "middlemen in
the private adoption business."
'28'
Even though the legislature mandated that "[u]nder no cir-
cumstances may a person ... receive ... compensation ... as
consideration for . . . consent" 282 to an adoption, it may have
underestimated a powerful force in the adoption process: the
baby broker. In a television expos6 of the lurid aspects of the
adoption business, 60 Minutes characterized the arrangement as
follows:
Abortions are up, the birth rate is down, and still there are
thousands of couples who want children and cannot have
them.... [T]hey want healthy white infants - and they are
scarcer than ever. Adoption agencies tell people to forget it.
They don't even have waiting lists anymore.
Enter a middleman, to meet the law of supply and demand
- a lawyer who, for a fee, sometimes a fee as high as $15,000,
will find a baby for a childless couple.
2 3
Unfortunately, 60 Minutes broadcast a conservative esti-
mate of the fees charged by some of these baby brokers. Richard
Gitelman of Coral Springs, Florida, who is not an attorney, oper-
ates what he terms "a private adoption referral service in the
South. ' 2 4 Gitelman uses classified advertising, often in rural ar-
eas, to identify young, pregnant women willing to place their
children for adoption. He promises them spending money, new
maternity clothes, and full coverage of medical expenses. He
280. The State, Mar. 1, 1984, at 8-A, col. 5.
281. Id., June 15, 1984, at 1-A, col. 4. Lewis warned that "[i]f society sanctions
adoptions as a business in which people make a profit, then it has to be regulated better.
When babies become a commodity the same market factors take over, and we'll have a
situation where the middle man is making the money." Id. at 13-A, col. 1.
282. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1690(F) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988).
283. 60 Minutes: Baby For Sale (CBS television broadcast, July 27, 1975).
284. N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1987, at 1B, col. 3.
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supplies round trip air fare for the young women to a state with
accommodating laws, where she awaits her delivery. Upon birth
her child is placed for adoption. Mr. Gitelman runs his business
largely from his home where he deals with hundreds of prospec-
tive adoptive families awaiting his telephone call. While the
birth mothers receive no other money, Gitelman receives fees
possibly as high as $50,000.285 In a recent conversation with a
South Carolina adoption attorney, Mr. Gitelman quoted his fee
as $15,000.28 Whichever fee is correct, it includes no payment to
the birth mother, no medical expenses, or attorney's fees; it is
solely Gitelman's fee for arranging the deal.
Another baby broker operating in South Carolina claims
that "God makes all the placements. We only do his clerical bid-
ding.128 7 To do "God's work," Seymour Kertz charges $14,000
for the placement: a $1,500 nonrefundable application fee and
the remaining $12,500 on delivery.28s  Kertz, who heads the
Friends of Children Adoption Agency of Atlanta, places black-
bordered advertising in telephone books seeking pregnant
women to give up their babies for adoption s.28  The advertise-
ment in the 1984 Columbia, South Carolina directory cost an es-
timated $9,000.290
To monitor the business transactions of baby brokers in
South Carolina, the Act requires that all fees received in connec-
tion with an adoption be reported to the court.29 1 As of January
1989, however, Richard Gitelman still searched for an adoption
attorney in South Carolina who could handle the legal work gen-
erated by the unending flow of pregnant women Gitelman pro-
poses to send to South Carolina to give birth e.2 2 Gitelman main-
285. See id. at col. 4.
286. Interview with anonymous member of the South Carolina Bar (February 15,
1989) (name withheld for reasons of confidentiality). Mr. Gitelman refused to confirm
either figure. Telephone interview with Richard Gitelman (July 14, 1989).
287. The State, Feb. 26, 1984, at 6-A, col. 6.
288. See id. at col. 5.
289. The current "Friends of Children" advertisement can be found in GREATER
SPARTANBURG SOUTHERN BELL-BELLSOUTH COMPANY Yellow Pages 3 (Oct. 1988 - Oct.
1989).
290. See The State, Feb. 26, 1984, at 1-A, col. 2.
291. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1775 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988).
292. Telephone interview with an anonymous member of the South Carolina Bar
(February 15, 1989) (names withheld for reasons of confidentiality). Mr. Gitelman re-
fused to comment on this point. Telephone interview with Richard Gitelman (July 14,
1989).
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tains that South Carolina law, despite the requirement of
disclosure of all fees paid in connection with an adoption, does
not prohibit his type of business.29 Before analyzing the ex-
pense and fee provisions of the Adoption Act, a philosophical
framework for that analysis must be explored. The following
framework is applicable both to an adoption attorney's practice
and to the court's scrutiny of the adoption process.
VII. PHILOSOPHICAL FRAMEWORK FOR ADOPTIONS
Some commentators express little concern over the money
trail flowing after some newborn infants. One South Carolina
family court judge once stated the following:
Even if baby selling does exist, what's so horrible about that?
If the child is going to a home with good parents who can give
it all the love and security it will ever need, why should we care
if the parents paid $50,000 for the privilege? The child is
happy, the parents are happy, so what is the harm? 94
The judge, speaking of women who offer their children for adop-
tion, offers the following justification for his position:
Their mothers are the scum of the earth, the dregs of society,
and if they kept the children, they'd raise them over in the
Franklin Trailer Park on welfare and give them no father fig-
ure, or only a fleeting father figure with all their boyfriends in
and out. Those little babies would have no stability in their
lives, getting dumped on their welfare mama's welfare mama or
welfare grandmama, and sooner or later we'd see them here in
family court with cigarette burns where their ears used to be
and marks where she's beat them with an electric cord.
29 6
In short, this judge seems to assert that a person's ability to pay
signifies his fitness as a parent and that whatever his qualifica-
tions, he certainly outclasses the ignorant poor.
The judge's comments embody two of the most pervasive
fallacies of adoption law - fallacies that, if not exposed, pose
serious consequences to the child, birth mother, adoptive par-
ents, and ultimately to the society that tolerates them. First, the
293. See id.
294. Newborn Fever, supra note 19, at 31.
295. The State, Mar. 1, 1984, at 1-A, col. 5.
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judge's comments fail to recognize that adoption is a life-altering
and emotionally charged process for the birth mother, one which
demands the full protection of the court.296 Francis Lewis, the
former Executive Director of the Children's Bureau of South
Carolina, contrasts the judge's viewpoint as follows:
The women involved are almost all from "nice," middle-class
families, and most of them care very deeply about their babies.
They grieve. They send letters and pictures to go in the babies'
files in case they ever want to know why they were given up.
They want their children to be well provided for, but they
want most for their children to be loved.29
While the paramount focus should be on the welfare of the
child, the birth mother's rights must be protected and her dig-
nity maintained. Instead, all too often, the birth mother is
viewed more as a manufacturer, the child as merchandise, and
the adoptive parents as customers.29 s
The second fallacy underlying the judge's comments is that
because adoption attorneys provide a service, market forces ade-
quately protect the parties and society from any undesirable
consequence of their business relationship. Outspoken conserva-
tive spokeswoman Phyllis Schiafly agreed: "Where there is a
willing seller and an eager buyer, and the baby moves from an
unwanted environment into a home with loving adoptive par-
ents, where's the crime? . . . If there is such a thing as a vic-
timless crime, this is it."2 99 One attorney claimed that
"[c]hildren are not brokered; the high costs and cash payments
are just 'part of the process. . . .' You know, this kind of thing
happens in every area, [for instance in] [r]eal estate .... "I"
If the bar demands no higher degree of financial accounta-
bility for the practice of adoption law than is required in the
practice of real estate law, an infant is relegated to equal status
with metes, bounds, and access to city water. If society allows
296. In determining the rights of the parties to an adoption, one court cautioned the
bench to be mindful that "humble status and indigence are the honorable condition of
many, and often the fruitful soil of virtue, discipline, and aspiration." McClary v. Follett,
226 Md. 436, 442, 174 A.2d 66, 69 (Ct. App. 1961).
297. The State, March 1, 1984, at 8-A, col. 6.
298. See L. McTAGGART, supra note 95, at 339 (1980).
299. This comment later earned Ms. Schlafly a 1978 Ms. MAGAZINE Ayn Rand Free
Enterprise Award. See id. at 317.
300. Id.
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adoption to be governed solely by market forces and if adoption
is thought of in terms of market rhetoric, it condones a perverse
twist of the free market system, in turn diminishing personhood
generally.
If a capitalistic baby industry were to come into being[,] ...
how could any of us, even those who do not produce infants for
sale, avoid subconsciously measuring the dollar value of our
children? How could our children avoid being preoccupied with
measuring their own dollar value? This makes our discourse
about ourselves (when we are children) and about our children
(when we are parents) like our discourse about cars. 01
This philosophical thesis may be rejected by some in favor
of the invisible hand of market forces. Assuming for the sake of
these dissenters that no moral distinction exists between the sale
of an automobile and an infant, the market forces at play in
adoption nonetheless require strict judicial scrutiny of the fees
involved - not because of the product involved, but because of
the unfair market conditions this product generates.
According to the National Committee for Adoption, adop-
tions between unrelated persons declined by 38% between 1971
and 1982.3o2 More abortions, greater contraceptive use, and the
lessening social stigma of single parenthood all contribute to this
decline .303 Experts estimate that one in five couples of reproduc-
tive age have difficulty conceiving.30 4 The ratio of parents seek-
ing to adopt and the number of adoptable babies is as dispropor-
tionate as 100 to 1.305
This adoption market is fueled by young couples' emotional
search for an adoptable child, not by the informal judgment of a
dispassionate shopper. Some couples' sense of desperation drives
them to seek adoptable children by placing notices on cars at
shopping center parking lots, on park benches, and on railroad
overpasses. °6 Jeff Rosenberg, the Director of Adoption Services
for the National Committee for Adoptions states that "I have
had very legitimate couples tell me that they would do anything,
301. Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARv. L. REV. 1849, 1926 (1987).
302. See N.Y. Times, April 5, 1987, at A30, col. 4.
303. See id.
304. See id. at 10C, col. 5.
305. See id., June 26, 1986, at 1C, col. 2.
306. See id., Apr. 5, 1987, at 1A, col. 4.
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literally anything, to have a baby. It's a real desperation."30 7
For some of the fortunate few couples who find an adopta-
ble baby and can afford the fees involved, their sense of relief
can be blinding. One adoptive mother stated that "[wI]hen you're
about to get a child, you don't care about the bill. . . . You're
not going to bargain for a child. 3 0 Furthermore, the nature of
the deal allows baby brokers to secure their fortunes with impu-
nity; adoptive couples seldom consider themselves victims.0 9
Those adoptive parents who do feel victimized often are reluc-
tant to come forward for fear that their child may be taken
away.
310
Given the volatility of the adoption market, even the most
vociferous supporter likely would agree that free market princi-
ples cannot adequately protect the interests of the parties to an
adoption contract. Even Judge Richard Posner, the preeminent
advocate for unrestrained free market principles, would draw
the line here. After a brief flirtation with the idea of a free baby
market,31' he recently recanted, acknowledging that he "did not
advocate a free market in babies.3 12 The baby broker's relation-
ship with the adoptive couple is the classic example of unequal
bargaining positions, and courts and legislatures must be ready
to correct the imbalance.
VIII. A MATTER OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION: EXPENSES AND FEES
Baby selling is illegal313 and an "ugly and barbaric prac-
tice. ' 314 Yet, some do accept a practice where a middle man, a
baby broker, charges exorbitant prices to a family for the privi-
lege of adopting a child. One commentator has asked, "Is mor-
ally 'wrong' for a girl to hold up her baby for sale, but okay for
307. Id., Oct. 29, 1987, at 6B, col. 5.
308, Baby Brokers, supra note 87, at 24.
309. See L. McTAGGART, supra note 95, at 276.
310. See id.
311. See Landes & Posner, The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL STUD.
323 (1978).
312. Posner, Mischaracterized Views, 69 JUDICATURE 321 (1986).
313. See S.C. CODE ANN, § 16-3-1060 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988).
314. Editorial Notes, Survey of New Jersey Adoption Law, 16 RUTGERS L. REV. 379,
407 (1962). One particularly egregious instance of baby selling occurred in California,
where a man was convicted of attempting to sell his two-year-old daughter for $90,000.
See N.Y. Times, July 27, 1986, at 1A, col. 2.
818 [Vol. 40
52
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 3 [], Art. 8
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol40/iss3/8
SOUTH CAROLINA ADOPTION LAW
anyone else to do so[?]"3 15 When originally passed in 1986, the
Adoption Act addressed this inconsistency: "Under no circum-
stances may a parent. . . receive a fee . . . for consent. . . for
the purpose of adoption. However, costs may be assessed as they
are reimbursements for expenses incurred or fees for services
rendered. 3 1 6 The June 7, 1988 amendments expanded this sec-
tion as follows: "Under no circumstances may . . . any person
receive a fee . . . for giving a consent . . . for the purpose of
adoption . . . ." Costs, however, may be assessed and payment
made for "reasonable attorney's fees and costs for actual services
rendered [and] reasonable fees to child placing agencies." '17 By
allowing payment only of reasonable attorneys' fees for actual
services rendered, the legislature demonstrated its intent to halt
the practice of those who make a life's work of exploiting
couples' desire for an adoptable baby. Representative David
Wilkins, who introduced the adoption bill in the state House of
Representatives, stated that the General Assembly was aware of
the baby brokering stories in the press when it penned the June
1988 amendments.3 " Representative Wilkins feels that the legis-
lature designed the changes to promote tough judicial scrutiny
of the baby brokering problem. 1
As for adoption referral services such as Richard
Gitelman's, a close reading of the statute reveals that paying for
these services is impermissible. To qualify for compensation, the
services must be conducted by a duly licensed child-placing
agency, as required by law,320 or by an attorney. While Section
20-7-1690(f)(5) allows reimbursement for "costs for actual ser-
vices rendered," the statute contemplates only those costs in-
curred by an attorney.3 21 The statute clearly enumerates each
315. L. McTAGGART, supra note 95, at 317.
316. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1690(D) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1986).
317. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1690(F) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988).
318. See Telephone interview with Representative David Wilkins, Chairman of the
South Carolina House Judiciary Committee (Jan. 14, 1989).
319. See id.
320. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1650(e) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988). Mr. Gitelman
makes the tenuous argument that after introducing the birth mother and adoptive
couple, he removes himself from the adoption process. Therefore, because his services
take place before the actual adoption proceeding begins, his fees need not be reported to
the court nor satisfy judicial scrutiny. Such a tortured construction negates the policy
behinds the act. Telephone interview with Richard Gitelman (July 14, 1989).
321. See id. § 20-7-1690(F)(5).
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exception to the prohibition against the transfer of funds. To
allow compensation for nonlawyers under the section designated
for attorneys would be a strain of statutory construction. Even if
allowed, $50,000 surely exceeds what could be considered costs
for "actual services rendered."
The definition of "reasonable attorney fees for actual ser-
vices rendered" 322 likely will be a topic of great speculation as to
what constitutes both reasonable fees and "actual services." One
New Jersey court wrestled with the construction of a similar
statute, stating that "receipt of compensation for legitimate legal
services performed in an adoption" is permitted; however, fees
that were "more like a broker's fee or finder's fee" would be dis-
allowed.2 23 For example, efforts spent securing the birth
mother's consent, preparing documents, and filing motions
clearly are actual services. Although consulting with a birth
mother about her child's potential adoption would be an actual
service, once a birth mother consented to an adoption, the attor-
ney would be prohibited from charging the adoptive parents
merely for the opportunity to adopt a child. This would be a
finder's or broker's fee in excess of the actual services the attor-
ney provided the adoptive parents.
The Committee on Professional and Judicial Ethics of the
State Bar of Michigan stated, "There is no place in this kind of
a situation for finder's fees, commissions or bonuses" and that
these payments are "not only professionally unethical, but mor-
ally wrong. '32" The New York State Legislature correctly labeled
independent adoptions that "involved a payment of money in
consideration of the placements [as] . . . 'black market' or 'boot-
leg' placement[ ].,"325 Practically speaking, however, these pro-
nouncements may be of little help. One commentator has recog-
322. Id. In Mr. Gitelman's defense, he claims to incur extremely high expenses re-
lated to the identification of potential birth mothers. If Mr. Gitelman were an attorney
and his expenses could be documented, the statute would not prohibit charging a reason-
able fee for those services. Clearly, this statutory fee provision is fact specific and re-
quires strict judicial scrutiny.
323. In re Adoption of a Child by N.P., 165 N.J. Super. 591, 596, 398 A.2d 937, 940
(Ct. Law. Div. 1979).
324. State Bar of Mich. Comm. on Professional and Judicial Ethics, Op. 156 (1953),
reprinted in 8 MICH. ST. B.J., 205, 207 (1959).
325. Joint Legislative Committee on Interstate Cooperation, Report of the Special
Committee on Social Welfare (N.Y. Leg. Doc. 1949, No. 62) (noted in In re Adoption of
E.W.C., 89 Misc. 2d 64, 75, 389 N.Y.S.2d 743, 751 (1976)).
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nized that "[w]hen a 'professional fee' is charged, it is often
difficult to ascertain whether the fee went towards 'professional
services' or actually went to the adoption placement activity (or,
as perhaps most frequently happens, went for some kind of com-
bination of the two).
3 26
To aid the court in this inquiry, the Act requires a fully
itemized accounting of all disbursements at the final hearing of
an adoption,327 which the adoptive couple must verify under
penalty of perjury.3 28 Although not required by statute, a family
court judge would be well advised to investigate the source of
the couple's referral to the attorney handling the adoption. A
systematic investigation of these referral sources would alert the
bench to otherwise undisclosed transactions. This accounting is
the "mechanism for alerting the court to any irregularities.
'329
Even though brokers' fees are not allowed by the statute,
courts still must grapple with the reasonableness of the fees for
compensable services.330 Although a survey conducted by the
New York Times31 indicates that fees for independent adop-
tions generally range from $1,500 to $3,500, the South Carolina
Code of Professional Responsibility provides the factors by
which individual cases must be analyzed. 2  A failure to scruti-
326. Note, Babes and Barristers: Legal Ethics and Lawyer-Facilitated Indepen-
dent Adoptions, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 933, 961 (1984) (emphasis in original).
327. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1775 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988).
328. See id.
329. Model State Adoption Act § 21 commentary, reprinted in 19 FAM. L.Q. 103, 121
(1985) (Tentative Draft 1984).
330. This is especially difficult given the "fact-sensitive nature of independent
placement activities." See Note, supra note 152, at 959.
331. N.Y. Times, June 26, 1986, at C1O, col. 6.
332.
(A) A lawyer shall not enter into an agreement for, charge, or collect an illegal
or clearly excessive fee.
(B) A fee is clearly excessive when, after a review of the facts, a lawyer of
ordinary prudence would be left with a definite and firm conviction that the
fee is in excess of a reasonble fee. Factors to be considered as guides in deter-
mining the reasonableness of a fee include the following:
(1) The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions
involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly.
(2) The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the
particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer.
(3) The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services.
(4) The amount involved and the results obtained.
(5) The time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances.
(6) The nature and legnth of the professional relationship with the client.
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nize closely adoption fees and payments scores of forum-shop-
ping attorneys around the country that South Carolina's baby
market is still open for business - producing the same national
notoriety that the Act seeks to eliminate. Such strict judicial
scrutiny will affirm the bar's high calling: "Impress upon your-
self the importance of your profession; consider that some of the
greatest and most important interests of the world are commit-
ted to your care. . . .In all the civil difficulties of life, men de-
pend upon your exercised faculties and your spotless
integrity.
'333
James Fletcher Thompson
(7) The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers per-
forming the services.
(8) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
S.C. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106 (1989).
333. S. SMITH, Master, What Shall I Do to Inherit Eternal Life?, in THE LAWYER
THAT TEMPTED CHRIST (1824), reprinted in 29 CAN. B. REV. 720, 720 (1951).
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